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Although there does exist a body of scholarly literature on the 
Cratylus, it is, by comparison, a rather thin one. Undoubtedly, the major 
reason for this is that most scholars have tended to agree with A. E. 
Taylor's judgment that the Cratylus is something of an "occasional piece." 
One indication of how widely Taylor's view has been accepted is the fact 
that there has not yet been a single commentary on the Cratylus published 
m English. 
In one sense, then, it is fair to say that the purpose of the present 
study is to show that such neglect has been undeserved. On the interpreta-
tion offered in the following pages, the Cratylus becomes something more 
than an occasional piece. To anyone interested in finding out why Plato 
came to deal, in the way he did, with the particular metaphysical and 
epistemological questions which dominate the so-called "later dialogues," 
the Cratylus becomes an important, and perhaps crucial, starting point. 
According to the interpretation of the Cratylus given here, Plato's 
major concern in the dialogue is to solve a peculiar problem which had, 
most likely, puzzled some of his predecessors--namely, whether names were 
correct "by nature" or "by convention." It is argued that Plato was 
equally dissatisfied with both of these answers. The conventionalist view 
seemed to entail the fatal consequence that truth which was a property of 
statements, which were in turn constituted by names, must itself be a 
matter of convention. On the naturalist view, one appeared committed to 
the absurd conclusion that for each and every nameable there was a 
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particular vocal sound, which in virtue of nothing more than its auditory 
qualities, correctly named that nameable. 
The crux of the present interpretation is the attempt to defend the 
claim that Plato not only explicitly recognized the confusion which lay at 
the heart of the naturalist versus conventionalist dispute over the cor-
rectness of names, but he realized that in order to satisfactorily resolve 
the dispute it was necessary to postulate the existence of incorporeal, 
immutable entities. What had caused Plato's predecessors to view the ques-
tion of the correctness of names as an exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
distinction between nature and convention was their inability to conceive 
of an incorporeal existent. To them, an existent was something that was 
extended in space and capable of being apprehended by the senses. Thus, 
while pre-Platonic thought clearly recognized the existence of mental 
entities such as concepts and judgments, this recognition was based upon 
their being able to identify these entities with their physical manifesta-
tions, utterances, and inscriptions. Given such a conceptual framework, 
it is not difficult to see how Plato's predecessors could have failed to 
distinguish the phonetic properties of a name from its semantic properties, 
i.e., how a concept of a nameable could have been identified with the vocal 
sound used to communicate it. 
Thus, the argument among Plato's predecessors over the natural versus 
the conventional correctness of names was really an argument over the cor-
rectness of vocal sounds. As Plato clearly showed in Epistle VII, this was 
really no contest since it was patently obvious that the proper phonetic 
sequences of a natural language were fixed by convention. But if the con-
cept of the nameable was somehow either identical with or derivable from 
the conventionally correct vocal sound used to communicate that concept, 
then the truth or falsity of statements, which were constituted by sequences 
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of conventionally correct vocal sounds, must itself be a matter of conven-
tion. What Plato was able to see, as his predecessors were not, was the 
necessity of distinguishing the concept or "nature" of the thing named from 
its vocal sign. 
Moreover, Plato realized that if names and statements were to serve 
their purpose, these natures could not be corporeal objects, for he accepted 
what he took to be the basic doctrine of the Heraclitians that to be a 
corporeal object was to be constantly susceptible to change. But even 
Heraclitus recognized that the purpose in giving names to things was to 
"distinguish each thing according to its nature." Now Plato saw these two 
Heraclitian doctrines as inconsistent. How was one to distinguish and then 
declare the nature of anything if it was always changing or always suscepti-
ble to change? And if these natures themselves changed, as did all corporeal 
objects, how could anything be said to have a single nature according to 
which it could be distinguished9 Thus, Plato concluded that if language, 
and rational inquiry, which was dependent on language, were to have any 
possibility of successfully performing their functions, then there must be 
immutable, incorporeal existents. 
If the foregoing is anywhere near an accurate interpretation of what 
Plato was doing in the Cratylus, then it can no longer be considered an 
occasional piece. One consequence of such an interpretation is that it 
becomes plausible to suppose that the peculiar problem of whether names 
were correct by nature or by convention, which exercized Plato's attention 
in the Cratylus, and which has caused so many of Plato's commentators to 
speculate on what the Cratylus was really about, was in fact the impetus 
which led Plato to his first clear conception of the theory of ideas. 
Furthermore, once Plato had postulated the existence of immutable and 
incorporeal "natures," it was an easy matter to resolve the original 
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question. Names have both a natural and a conventional sort of correctness. 
To find out whether or not one had used the correct vocal sound to indicate 
a certain nameable was simply a matter of finding out what conventions and 
agreements were in force with respect to the particular natural language in 
question. But to find out whether or not that vocal sound "made clear the 
nature of the thing it named" was a matter of finding out whether or not it 
was defined correctly, i.e., whether or not its definition truly and com-
pletely described one of the immutable and incorporeal "natures." Such 
descriptions could never be made true by convention and agreement. 
The foregoing is a brief but fairly accurate summation of what is 
attempted in the following pages. It is an embarrassment to an author, as 
well as a disappointment to his reader, to have to admit at the very outset 
of his work that he has failed to achieve what he set out to do. It is 
particularly distressing when the failure was not inevitable but due to the 
author's own shortcomings. In this case the embarrassing shortcoming was 
dilatormess. Although the author had almost five years in which to com-
plete this work, the writing of Chapters III and IV was not begun until 
five months before the absolute deadline. Consequently, while the first 
two chapters make at least a show of scholarly care and thoroughness, the 
last two are, by comparison, hurried, somewhat carelessly written, and 
often lacking in important and necessary detail. They have-more the 
character of chapter proposals rather than fully worked-out chapters. This 
is not to say that the argument of the latter half of this work is mistaken 
or indefensible; it simply needs to be defended more adequately than I have 
done. In particular, there is little or no effort made in III and IV, and 
especially IV, to present and attempt to meet the objections which would be 
raised by commentators whose analyses of the Cratylus differ, and in some 
cases contradict my own. Because of this, the entire argument is neither 
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as convincing, nor as cogent as it might have been. Unfortunately, at this 
date I can do no more than offer my apology for these inexcusable delin-
quencies . 
A word or two needs to be said concerning the English translations of 
Greek passages. It will be obvious to anyone familiar with the existing 
translations of the Greek texts cited in this work that I have stolen freely 
and without acknowledgment the fruits of the labor of others, most notably 
Fowler, Jowett, and Kirk and Raven. In some cases where I thought it justi-
fied, I have emended existing translations, and in a few cases I have even 
offered translations which were wholly my own. Nevertheless, in all three 
cases I have proceeded on the assumption that the full responsibility for 
the accuracy of the translation was my own. Those English passages, which 
are solely the work of other writers, appear only because I have authorized 
and guaranteed their accuracy. Thus, any mistakes should be attributed not 
to them, but to me, and to insure that this responsibility remains mine 
alone, I have refrained from acknowledging their work. 
Finally, it hardly needs to be said that no Ph.D. candidate ever com-
pletes a dissertation without incurring profound debts to his teachers. 
And while it is the nature of such debts to be unpayable, there does exist 
the happy custom of at least acknowledging them. I would therefore like to 
express my deep and lasting gratitude to my teacher and friend, Norman 
Kretzmann, to my teacher and friend, Charles Caton, and, most profound of 
all, to my teacher and adviser, Professor Max Harold Fisch. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BACKGROUND OF PLATO'S CRATYLUS 
No other Platonic dialogue has been subjected to as many and as varied 
interpretations as the Cratylus. Most of the controversies surrounding the 
dialogue are traceable to disagreements over the question of its "real" or 
"mam" topic. The aim of this chapter is not to settle that question, but 
to settle the boundaries, so to speak, within which any plausible answer to 
that question must fall. 
No commentator on the Cratylus would deny that the main topic of the 
dialogue appears to be a dispute about the "correctness of names" (7repi 
ovoiioxwv opeoxriTos Crat., 384 Bj. At the outset of the dialogue, Socrates 
is invited to act as mediator in a dispute between Hermogenes, who believes 
that names are correct by "convention and agreement" (SuvSriHn xat'opoXoy^a 
384 Dj, and Cratylus, who believes that names are correct "by nature" 
(<f>uaEi ire<|>i)iculav, 383 A). The issue between Hermogenes and Cratylus has 
been badly misinterpreted by most, if not all, writers on the Cratylus. 
The issue is not over the natural versus the conventional "origin of 
names," nor is it whether or not "primitive man [in giving names] was 
automatically inspired by some innate quality or psychological effect of 
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the thing itself." Nor does anyone in the dialogue claim that "objects 
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came into being with their names clinging to them like a skin." The issue 
is roughly this: consider a team of astronaut botanists landing on the 
moon m order to discover and classify lunar flora. If Hermogenes were 
right, they would (or could) fabricate different vocal sounds which would 
(or could) then become correct names for the various types of lunar flora 
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by having the members of the team simply adopt the convention of agreeing 
to use those vocal sounds as names. If Cratylus were right, they would 
have at least one expert among them whose expertise would consist in dis-
covering for each distinct type of lunar flora the vocal sound which is its 
correct name. It is a consequence of the conventionalist view that a vocal 
sound can correctly name its bearer because men have agreed to use that 
vocal sound as the name of that bearer. On the naturalist view it follows 
that there is a vocal sound which correctly names its bearer, regardless of 
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any agreements men might make. 
Now given that it is this question which Plato introduces at the very 
outset of the dialogue, and toward which he deliberately makes it appear 
the entire subsequent discussion is directed, the following three questions 
become relevant. (1) Who, among Plato's contemporaries or predecessors, 
held the extraordinary view that names are "naturally" correct? (2) What 
plausible motive could have prompted a contemporary or predecessor of 
Plato's to hold such a view? (3) If, as is suggested in Epistle VII, Plato 
considered the correct resolution of the dispute to be too obvious to 
require arguing for, why did he bother to devote an entire dialogue to it 
in the Cratylus? 
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If there is a single point on which writers on the Cratylus have found 
unanimity, it is that the view that names are correct "by nature" was a 
more or less common one in fifth-century Greece, and that its advocates 
actively debated with those who believed that names are correct "by con-
vention." The following sampling of opinion will give some indication of 
the extent to which this view has achieved the status of orthodoxy. 
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'Tis a famous dispute among the philosophers, whether 
names are imposed by nature, <f>uaet, or meerly by the agreement 
of men, and this is the subject of Plato's Cratylus. 
Hierocles, in this place follows the most-found opinion which 
is, that the first name-givers being inlightened by God him-
self, and thoroughly instructed in the nature of beings, gave 
everything its true name . . . . (Nicholas Rowe, Note on his 
translation of Hierocles Commentaries On the Golden Verses of 
Pythagoras, 1756, p. 352.) 
It is necessary to observe that there were two opinions 
of the ancients on the [question of the natural versus the 
conventional correctness of names], one of Heraclitus and his 
followers, among whom Cratylus held a considerable rank; the 
other of certain Parmenideans, among whom Hermogenes was no 
ignoble advocate. (Thomas Taylor, Introduction to his English 
translation of the Cratylus, London, B § J White, 1792, 
pp. xxi-xxii.) 
The question between Hermogenes and Kratylos was much 
debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout 
antiquity. (George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions 
of Socrates, Vol. II, London, 1865, p. 502.) 
In any case, Plato's attack upon the claims put forward 
in [Antisthenes's study of names] supplied him with an oppor-
tunity for reviewing the linguistic theories of the day, and 
m particular the theory of the correctness of names championed 
by his teacher Cratylus and other Heracliteans. (Theodore 
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, translated by G. G. Berry, New York, 
1903, p. 165.) 
Ancient speculations on the subject show the existence 
of two mam schools of thought supporting the respective 
theories of a "natural" and of a "conventional" origin: One 
school, that is to say, considers that in giving names to 
things, primitive man was automatically inspired by some 
innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself, 
while the other school maintains that names were evolved on 
a more or less fortuitous basis, and so have only an arbitrary 
symbolical connection with their objects. (W. S. Allen, 
"Ancient Ideas on the Origin and Development of Language," 
Transactions of the Philological Society, 1948, p. 36.) 
A more or less irrational belief m a natural connexion 
between names and things recurs again and again in Greek 
thought. Such a belief is perhaps magical in origin . . . . 
Heraclitus indeed appears to have thought that words had a 
significance other than artificial, and when he said (fr. 48) 
that "the name of the bow is life (Bios life, 3ids bow), but 
its function is death," he probably thought that he was 
adducing another valid example of the coincidence of oppo-
sites. (G. S. Kirk, "The Problem of Cratylus," American 
Journal of Philology, Vol. LXXII, 1951, p. 239.) 
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The question whether names were "natural" or "conventional," 
a strange one to us, became lively in the 5th century. Like 
many of the puzzles which the Sophists enjoyed, it had its 
roots in Parmenides. (W. K. G. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1965, p. 41.) 
It is worth noting that none of the above comments is either justified 
by or based upon anything that Plato says in the Cratylus. Such being the 
case, it is reasonable to ask what evidence exists, apart from the Cratylus, 
from which such comments could be either wholly or partially confirmed. As 




Fr. 32. The one wise thing is both willing and unwilling 
to be called by the name of Zeus. 
Fr. 48. The name of the bow is life, but its work is 
death. 
Fr. 67. God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, 
satiety-famine. But he changes like fire which when it 
mingles with the smoke and incense, is named according 
to each man's pleasure. 
7 
Aulus Gellius 
Publius Nigidius in his Grammatical Notes shows that 
names and verbs were formed, not by a chance use but by a 
certain power and design of nature, a subject very popular m 
the discussions of the philosophers. For they used to in-
quire whether names are natural or impositional (<j>uaet xa 
ovopaxa n Qeae\). 
o 
Origen 
It is a deep and esoteric argument concerning the nature 
of names whether, as Aristotle believes, they are convention-
ally imposed, or, as the Stoics think, they exist by nature. 
9 
Proclus 
Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus 
while Democritus and Aristotle held with Hermogenes. In the 
expression "the giver of names" [Pythagoras] hinted at the 
soul which derives from mind. Things themselves are not pri-
mary realities as is the mind, and [the soul] has likenesses 
of them and essential comprehensive notions like images of 
the realities, such as names which are imitations of the 
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intellectual forms, the numbers. Accordingly, the being of 
everything derives from the self-conscious and wise mind, but 
names derive from soul, which imitates mind. Therefore, says 
Pythagoras, it is not any chance person who can give names to 
things, but only he who sees mind and the nature of things. 
Names, therefore, exist by nature. 
But Democritus, saying that names are impositional (Oeoei), 
established this by means of four lines of attack: (1) from 
sameness of name; for different things are called by the same 
name, and thus the name is not natural (<j>uaei); (2) also from 
plurality of names having sameness of reference; for if they 
adapt different names to one and the same thing [those names 
are], also one upon another (euaXXnXa), the very thing that is 
impossible; (3) third, from change of imposition (jjeraeeaetos) 
of names; for why did we change the name (iJETU>vovi<£aaviEv) of 
Aristocles to "Plato" or of Tyrtamus to "Theophrastus" if 
names are natural7; (4) from the absence of analogues (TTIS 
TQV oyoiajv eAAeu|/ea)s); for why do we say that Qpovdiv (to 
understand) comes from <j>povnais (the understanding) but no 
longer derive a [verb] (irapovoya^opev) from 6iKouoa\Jvri 
(justice)*7 Because names are fortuitous (tuxp), not natural. 
He himself calls the first line of attack "Many Signed" 
(iroAuoTiviov), the second "Equally Balanced" (laoppoirov), the 
third "Name Changed," and the fourth "Name Missing" (vdjvuyov) . 
Ammonius 
. . . Therefore Socrates in the Cratylus arbitrated a 
dispute between Cratylus and Hermogenes who were diametrically 
opposed over the question whether names represented by nature 
or by imposition, Hermogenes believing that names are impo-
sitional (. . .) and Heraclitus saying that names are natural. 
I shall try to show that these passages do not, either singly or col-
lectively, provide adequate evidence for the claim that the question of the 
natural versus the conventional correctness of names had any currency m 
Greek intellectual circles prior to the writing of the Cratylus. 
Among recent writers the view that the fragments of Heraclitus reveal 
an awareness of some sort of natural or essential connection between names 
and their bearers has been most forcefully argued by G. S. Kirk in 
Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge, 1962). In his discussion of 
Fr. 48, Kirk attempts to justify his interpretation of Heraclitus as a 
naturalist (or proto-naturalist) by appealing to Fr. 67: 
i 
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For just as when myrrh is cast into the flames of a sacrificial 
fire it is wrong to describe the mixture simply as "myrrh," yet 
it remains true that myrrh forms a part of the mixture, so when 
god is described simply as "day" or "peace," without any men-
tion of the corresponding contraries, he is only being described 
in part; such a description would be misleading, because incom-
plete, but it would not be untrue in the sense of being entirely 
false. Thus the name which is given to a complex cannot be 
entirely ignored, for it will tell us something about the com-
plex, even if only about one of its constituents. So too m fr. 
32 Heraclitus talks of something which "is unwilling and willing 
to be called by the name of Zeus": whatever is the reference of 
this remark, it is clear that this name does to some extent cor-
respond with the true nature of the subject, and to this extent 
it is approved; hence it may be deduced that Heraclitus was not 
surprised to find some real correspondence between the name and 
the thing named, even if this correspondence is usually far 
from complete.H 
I find the argument of this passage totally unconvincing. What is 
particularly striking about it is that there is nothing in it except the 
conclusion, with which a thoroughgoing conventionalist could not agree. 
Even if it were true that a name may "tell us something" about a complex by 
"completely" naming one of its constituents, this reveals nothing about the 
relation of the name to either the constituent or the complex. Those who 
believe that the vocal sound "myrrh" is conventionally imposed upon the 
mixture in the sacrificial fire tell each other the same "something" by 
describing the fire as "myrrh" as those who believe that the vocal sound 
has a "real correspondence" with the mixture or one of its constituents. 
It is surprising that Kirk fails to notice that in the Cratylus, Plato 
makes use of exactly the same kind of case as is described in Fr. 67 and 
comes to a conclusion which is diametrically opposed to Kirk's. 
But variety in the syllables [of ovopaxa] is admissible, 
so that names which are the same appear different to the un-
initiated, just as the physicians' drugs, when prepared with 
various colors and perfumes, seem different to us, though 
they are the same, but to the physician, who considers only 
their medicinal value, they seem the same, and he is not 
confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows 
about names considers their value and is not confused if 
some letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even 
if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different 
letters.!2 
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This is, it seems to me, as plausible an interpretation of either 
Fr. 67 or Fr. 32 as is Kirk's and is one which could be accepted by even 
the most extreme conventionalist. 
This is not, however, what Kirk considers his strongest argument. He 
goes on to say: 
A much more cogent indication of the fact that for Heraclitus 
names bore some essential relation to objects, and were 
capable of revealing a truth about them which might not be 
otherwise obvious, is provided by the not uncommon instances 
of etymology in the tragedians and especially in Aeschylus— 
whose Agamemnon, produced in 458, cannot have been written 
much more than twenty years after Heraclitus' death . . . ." 
He then proceeds to mention several words for which the etymologies are 
given in the works of Aeschylus, e.g., rEXevav, •'ATTOXXWV, KTI^OS, etc. It 
is significant to note that the three examples do not differ in kind from 
the sorts of words that appear m the long etymological section of the 
Cratylus. Again, it is somewhat surprising to find that Kirk ignores what 
Plato has to say at the end of that section with respect to the fruitful-
ness of etymologizing. 
SOC. But let us bear m mind that if a person asks about the 
words by means of which names are formed, and again about 
those by means of which those words were formed, and keeps on 
doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at 
last give up; will he not? 
HER. Yes, I think so. 
SOC. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and 
stopping? Will it not be when he reaches the names which are 
the elements of the other names and words? For these, if 
they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be 
composed of other names. For instance, we said just now that 
&ya0ov was composed of byaatov and 8odv; and perhaps we might 
say that 6oov was composed of other words, and those of still 
others; but if we ever get hold of a word which is no longer 
composed of other words, we should be right in saying that we 
had at last reached an element, and that we must no longer 
refer to other words for its derivation. 
HER. I think you are right. 
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SOC. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking 
elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness 
by some other method91** (My underlining") 
It is clear, I think, that the point of Socrates's closing rhetorical 
question is to show the futility of trying to settle the original question 
between Hermogenes and Cratylus by etymologizing. Given the view that 
certain words are "naturally" developed out of other words, the only words 
relevant to that question become those which have no etymologies. There is 
no reason to suppose that Hermogenes, believing that the vocal sounds "bird" 
and "dog" are conventionally imposed upon their respective bearers, could 
not agree that it would be natural to call a dog who retrieves birds a 
bird-dog. 
Equally damaging to Kirk's argument is the fact that "natural" in the 
above sense of "non-arbitrary" was recognized by early writers on the 
Cratylus who then distinguished it sharply from the sense of "natural" used 
by Cratylus in the dialogue, i.e., "natural" as "non-artificial." The dis-
tinction, as drawn by Ammomus, is between names as "products of nature" 
(6TiyioupYniiaTa ) as Cratylus believed, and names as aptly describing the 
nature of their bearers (01 6e ouxtus auxa <\>6ae\ (j>aa\v eivai d>s T\) <}>U0EI 
irpooTiKovTa TGV ovoyaCoyEVtov uir' auxfiv irpayyaTajv). Ammomus then goes on 
to mention, as an example of this second sense of "natural," such names as 
"Archidamus," "Agesilaus," "Basiliskus," etc., which are naturally suited 
names for a great leader. At the risk of belaboring the point, it is obvious 
that the kind of natural correctness accruing to "Archidamus" does not 
imply that there is a natural correctness of any kind accruing to either 
"arche" or "demos." We may conclude, then, that what these two passages 
show is that an interest in etymology need not have indicated a correspond-
ing interest in the question of whether names are "essentially related," to 
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their bearers, at least not in the sense of "essentially related" which is 
at issue in the Cratylus. 
Kirk's third and final argument deals directly with Fr. 48. In drawing 
out the consequences of that fragment, he writes: 
What is quite clear is that the bow is yet another example of 
the concurrence in a particular concrete instance of two 
states normally counted as radically opposed to each other. 
In this instance the name of the implement in question is 
almost identical with the name of the opposite of the imple-
ment's chief function. If names were considered by Heraclitus 
to have no real connexion with things, then this instance 
would be utterly worthless: as it is, he considered that 
there was some real connexion, that the name could indicate 
an otherwise obscure truth about the thing to which it was 
attached; therefore this opposition between name and function, 
while not meaning that the bow was life or anything of this 
sort, had enough force to support a case demonstrated at 
greater length and with fuller documentation elsewhere. Only 
if this interpretation is accepted does the fragment have any 
real point; and point is something which all of Heraclitus' 
sayings seem pre-eminently to have had,17 
Such an interpretation borders on wishful thinking. In order for 
Kirk's comments above even to be applicable to Fr. 48, that fragment would 
have to read "the name of the bow is life but the name of its work is 
death." It seems clear from the above quotation that Kirk reads the frag-
ment this way, but the only justification he appears to have for such a 
reading is that it supports his interpretation. Kirk correctly recognizes 
in the fragment the opposition between ovoya and epyov but then concludes 
that it is only on his interpretation that it has a real point. Why could 
not Heraclitus have written Fr. 48 in order to call attention to the fact 
that while men impose names on things, and, consequently, believe that in 
understanding the name they also understand the thing named, they fail to 
take account of the basic opposition between what the thing appears to be 
(determined by its name) and what it really is (determined by its function)? 
Such a reading would be thoroughly Heraclitean in spirit and would make no 
less a "real point" than the reading given to it by Kirk. In short, what 
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my criticism of Kirk amounts to is not that Heraclitus was clearly not in 
some sense a naturalist (which he may have been) but that, from the evidence 
available to us, deciding the question either way with any degree of confi-
dence leaves one open to the charge of arbitrariness. 
Although Grote cites both the Gellius and the Origen passages as evi-
dence that the question was much debated "throughout antiquity," it hardly 
needs arguing that neither passage warrants such an assertion if "through-
18 
out antiquity" is understood to include the period prior to the writing 
of the Cratylus. On the evidence of these passages alone, there is no 
reason not to suppose that the discussions to which those passages refer 
arose as a result of the discussants having read the Cratylus. 
Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence, and certainly the one most 
often cited by the modern commentators quoted above, is the long passage 
from Proclus's commentary on the Cratylus. Since the views of both Epicurus 
and Aristotle are irrelevant to the present issue, I shall concentrate my 
remarks on what Proclus says about Pythagoras and Democritus. There are 
several difficulties with respect to Proclus's comments on Pythagoras. 
First, in attributing the closing remarks of the first paragraph directly 
to Pythagoras, Proclus is in conflict with the traditional and widely 
accepted opinion that Pythagoras wrote nothing and that his immediate 
hearers in the order were forbidden to repeat his teachings. It seems 
likely then that Proclus, if he is quoting anybody, is quoting either some 
later Pythagorean, or someone whom he believes is accurately reporting the 
words of Pythagoras himself. In either case it becomes an undecidable 
question whether Proclus's source is prior to or subsequent to the Cratylus. 
Second, of the views that Proclus ascribes to Pythagoras in the above pas-
sage the only one which bears any resemblance to Pythagoreanism, as we 
know it, is the identification of the forms and numbers. The rest almost 
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certainly is derived from Plotinus's interpretation of the Timaeus. The 
argument of the passage seems to be this: since the whole of the intellig-
ible kosmos (xtSv OVTUV) is a product of Nous, and Psyche is an imitation of 
Nous (i.e., Psyche is the moving copy, the Telos of whose motion is the 
model Nous), the products of Psyche must be imitations of the products of 
Nous. Thus, names which are the products of Psyche are imitative of the 
intellectual forms, the numbers, which are products of Nous. It is unclear 
whether Proclus's remarks are intended to show that names being produced by 
Psyche as imitations of Number-Forms are a fortiori natural or that names 
are natural imitations of the Number-Forms as opposed to conventional ones. 
The argument seems designed to show the former, but the last sentence of the 
paragraph, which Proclus appears to be quoting, can only be understood as 
concluding the latter. That sentence implies that he who produces an un-
natural imitation of a number-form (because his soul is ignorant of "mind 
and the nature of things") and then gets others to agree to use his imita-
tion does not produce the name which exists by nature. It is puzzling, 
however, to find that in the Greek text the sentence begins with the infer-
ential particle ctpa as though what follows it is being inferred from what 
precedes it. Yet there is nothing in the preceding part of the passage 
which either warrants or seems intended to warrant such a conclusion. One 
plausible way to account for this apparent discrepancy is to suggest that 
Proclus, perhaps unconsciously, is conflating Plotmus and Pythagoreanism 
into a mixture with a texture similar to that of oil and water. But once 
the plausibility of this suggestion is accepted, the plausibility of ques-
tioning the accuracy of Proclus's account must also be accepted. 
Finally, even if the quoted sentence is genuine and Proclus's inter-
pretation accurate, it is far from certain that the kind of "naturalness" 
of names at issue in the passage has anything to do with the properties of 
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vocal sounds. In "giving names," especially in a natural language which 
contains common nouns and verbs, something more is involved than merely 
producing a vocal sound. That vocal sound must be given a "meaning" or 
"definition" in order for it to function in the language (i.e., in order 
for it to be understood by the other speakers of the language). Thus, to 
discover and assign the correct definitions to the vocal sounds is an 
essential, if not the essential task of him who gives names. Surely it is 
imaginable that the author or authors whom Proclus is quoting could have 
been saying that such a task is naturally suited to the man "who sees mind 
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and the nature of things." Furthermore, the question whether names as 
vocal signs plus definitions are natural or conventional is different from 
and independent of the question whether certain vocal sounds are naturally 
or conventionally correct names. As I shall attempt to show later on, the 
distinction between these two questions is a crucial point in the Cratylus. 
The difficulties with Proclus's testimony concerning Democritus are 
equally serious. Diels considers Proclus's report to be a genuine fragment 
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of Democritus's writings, yet in the version given by Proclus, it is next 
to impossible that it could have been written by Democritus. Although the 
date of Democritus's death is unknown, most scholars agree that it could 
not have been much later than 370 B.C. Yet, in the third argument, he is 
supposed to have cited, as an example of yETiovuyov, the fact that 
Theophrastus, who was originally called Tyrtamus, had his later name 
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imposed on him by Aristotle. We know for certain, however, that 
Theophrastus was born somewhere between 372 and 369 B.C. Thus, in order 
for Proclus to be quoting Democritus, at least the following must be 
assumed. (1) Democritus lived one of the longest lives of antiquity, well 
over one hundred years. (The most plausible date for his birth is ca. 460 
B.C.) (2) Aristotle imposed the name "Theophrastus" on Tyrtamus while he, 
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somewhat odd to find Ammonius attributing, without comment, a view to 
Heraclitus which his teacher, whom he is following, specifically attributes 
only to Pythagoras and Epicurus. 
The upshot of the foregoing has been to suggest that (a) there is no 
adequate evidence to support the view that the dispute between Hermogenes 
and Cratylus was a popular and widespread one prior to the writing of the 
Cratylus, and (b) there is no good reason for claiming any one of the pre-
22 Socratic philosophers as the originator of the view held by Cratylus. 
However, the foregoing has not shown, nor was it intended to show, 
that, prior to the writing of the Cratylus, there was no_ discussion of this 
topic. The fact that Plato wrote the Cratylus is adequate testimony that 
at least two persons, Hermogenes and Cratylus, disagreed over this issue. 
Moreover, a careful reading of the dialogue shows that the disagreement was 
not confined to these two. At 384 B, Socrates is made to say, "If I had 
attended Prodicus's fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he 
himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject (7rep\ xouxo), 
there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correct-
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ness of names at once." What is especially significant about this remark 
is that the "subject" Socrates is referring to has just been explained to 
him by Hermogenes as the question whether or not there is any natural cor-
rectness of names (383 B - 384 A). Consequently, the mention of Prodicus 
and his lectures on "this subject" would not make sense in this context if 
Socrates believed that Prodicus, in discussing the correctness of names, 
had nothing whatever to say about natural versus conventional correctness. 
An even more compelling piece of evidence occurs at 428 B where 
Socrates, addressing Cratylus, says, " . . . you have not only investigated 
such matters yourself, but have been taught about them by others" (SOKEIS 
yap yoi aoxds XE £0KE<J>6OU xa xoicuJxa KOU irap' aXXwv y£ya9riKEvai) . This 
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sentence, which serves no useful purpose in the logical progression of the 
argument, seems most likely to have been inserted by Plato as a kind of 
scholium on Cratylus's view. The obvious suggestion, especially if one 
takes the portrayal of Cratylus in the dialogue as caricature, is that 
Plato is telling the knowledgeable reader, who is aware of what person or 
persons influenced Cratylus on this subject, that they are no less vulner-
able to caricature than he. Unfortunately, from this tantalizing aside, 
which is all that Socrates is given to say on the subject, the only justi-
fiable inference is that there were other thinkers, contemporary with 
Cratylus, who held the view that names were correct "by nature." However, 
with respect to the prospects of determining their identity, philosophical 
school, or number, we are reduced to unfounded speculation. 
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It is perhaps worth saying again that what has been shown in the pre-
ceding section is not that widespread controversy over the question of the 
natural versus the conventional correctness of names did not exist prior to 
the writing of the Cratylus, but that the evidence on which it has been 
positively asserted that there was such controversy is insufficient to war-
rant that assertion. At the same time, it has become clear that the evi-
dence available to warrant a positive denial is equally insufficient. 
Therefore, it is not implausible that prior to either the writing or the 
dramatic setting of the Cratylus, the question was being debated on a wider 
scale than the available evidence shows, 
But if this hypothesis is plausible, it is also puzzling. It raises 
the question of how and why such an issue could have attained currency 
among the mtellectuals of fifth-century Greece. By what process of reason-
ing and from what set of motives could have sprung the seemingly absurd 
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notion that for each nameable there was a particular vocal sound which, in 
virtue of nothing more than its auditory qualities, correctly named that 
nameable? In what follows, I shall attempt to develop a plausible answer 
to this question. 
The basis of the whole Sophistic controversy between voyos and $00 is 
was the recognition that from the fact that men thought or said or agreed 
that such-and-such was so-and-so it did not always follow that such-and-such 
was so-and-so. In those cases where men's thinking it so did make it so, 
its being so was said to be true or correct voyoi. In cases where what was 
so was so regardless of what' men might think or say, its being so was said 
to be true or correct <j>ua£i. By the time the debate reached its greatest 
intensity among the Sophist contemporaries of Socrates, the issue was not 
whether to accept the distinction as valid but whether such things as law, 
justice, language, etc., came under the heading of voyos or <|>ucns. 
However, in the century or so preceding the Socratic era, the distinc-
tion itself was struggling to emerge and in the history of its emergence 
linguistic concepts such as "statement" and "name" played a crucial role. 
The nature of this role is clearly described by F. Heinimann in his Nomos 
und Physis (Basel, 1945). According to Heinimann, the distinction between 
appearance and reality was recognized even in pre-Sophist times and was 
given expression in the language by means of two sets of contrasting word-
pairs, XOYOS/EPYOV and ovoya/spYov. As Heinimann clearly shows, the 
significance of these contrasting word-pairs is the association, in the 
early Greek mind, of the false, the mere appearance, with linguistic 
entities such as names and statements. What a man said was not a trust-
worthy criterion for what he really believed, but rather what he did. This 
association soon took the form of the Xoyoi and the ovoyaxa being identified 
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with the false, i.e., with what appeared to be so but was not really so. 
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By the time philosophical speculation had actively begun to replace 
mythology as a mode of explanation, these contrasts had entrenched them-
selves in the conceptual framework of the late sixth and early fifth 
century Greek mind to the point where ovoya came not only to designate the 
vocable aspect of a name, but its meaning as well. As the following passage 
from Heinimann makes clear, the name of a thing and the concept of a thing 
had not yet been distinguished. 
Die rationale Sprachbetrachtung setzt mit dem Beginn des 
5. Jahrhunderts ein. Wir sind gewohnt, sie aus der Perspek-
tive des platonischen "Kratylos" zu beurteilen und daher auch 
schon lhre Anfange von der Antithese Nomor-Physis beherrscht 
zu sehen. Es ist indessen klar, dass wir uns hier, wo nach der 
Entstehung dieser Antithese gefragt wird, von einer solchen 
Betrachtungsweise losen miissen. Wir werden also versuchen, 
die sparlichen Reste der Vorsokratiker, die ihre Anschauung 
vom Wesen der Sprache beleuchten, aus sich heraus moglichst 
ohne Hereintragen spaterer Kategorien zu verstehen. 
Stichwort ist das schon bei Homer in diesem Zusammenhang 
immer wiederkehrende KaXe'iv: 
Xenophanes B 32: riv x Ip iv KaXsouai, VE<J>OS KOU XOUXO 
TtefyVKE, TTOp<|>l>pEOV KCXI (JJOIVIKEOV KOU 
yXajpov ISEO"8CXI.26 
Anaxagoras B 19: 'Ipiv 5E KaX^oyEV xo EV XJIOIV 
VEijiEXnaiv avxiXayirov xp tUiw.27 
Empedokles B 9,5: oi Se'yis n raXEouai, voyaj 6"* ETri<j>nyi 
m\ auxds.28 
Alle drei Philosophen verwerfen das KOIXETV der Menschen als 
den Ausdruck einer falschen Memung und stellen ihm ihre 
richtigue Erkenntnis gegeniiber. Doch ist dabei zu beachten, 
dass die gebrauchlichen Benennungen der Dinge nur deshalb 
abgelehnr, werden, weil ihnen eine falsche Vorstellung 
zugrunde liegt. Denn fiir das archaische Denken sind Benennung 
und Begriff identisch, weil Gedanken nur dort, wo sie an die 
Oberflache treten, d.h. eben in der Sprache, fassbar sind; 
daher wird mit der Benennung zugleich der Begriff verworfen. 
Das gilt fur Xenophanes wie fiir Parmenides und Heraklit. 
Anaxagoras und Empedokles dagegen haben diese Stufe schon urn 
ein geringes uberschritten: Anaxagoras, der sich in dem 
icaXsoyEV selbst miteinschliesst, behalt den gottlichen Namen 
Iris bei fiir ein Phanomen, das er aus natiirlichen Gegebenheiten 
zu erklaren versteht, und Empedokles verwendet urn der 
allgemeinen Verstandlichkeit willen Ausdriicke, mit denen die 
Menge einen in seinen Augen falschen Begriff verbindet. Wie 
sehr daneben dennoch auch bei Anaxagoras Name und Begriff 
gleichgesetzt werden, zeigt sein Fragment B 17: 
xo 6E y(veaQa\ <ai onroXXua6ai OUK opeSs voyicouaiv oi 
EXAnvss. OUSEV yap XPnya yfvexai OU5E airo'XXoxai, aXX* 
airo eovxaiv xPnpaxuv auyy{ayexa{' xe <a\ fiiaicpfvexai. 
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KOU ouxios av opeSs KaXoiEV xo XE yi/vea8ai auyyiayEaOai 
Kai xo aTroXXuaQai fiiatcpi'vEaQai .29 
voyi?Eiv und KOXEIV sind hier beinahe synonym verwendet, indem 
beide den Sprachgebrauch bezeichnen. Dabei ist dieser freilich 
eine Folge der falschen Vorstellung, so dass wir daraus auch 
verstehen, wie voyi?Eiv zur Bedeutung "meinen," "glauben" 
kommen konnte. Es hat sie aber hier noch nicht. 
Auch mhaltlich stimmen Anaxagoras und Empedokles iiberein; 
Beide lehnen die Annahme eines Werdens und Vergehens der Dinge 
ab. Beide stehen mit dieser Lehre in eleatischer Tradition. 
Bei Parmenides ist deshalb auch der Urs pring dieser Verwerfung 
der gebrauchlichen Ausdrucksweise, des KOXE'IV, ZU suchen. 
Allerdmgs vermeidet er gerade dieses Wort an den Stellen, wo 
er sich mit dem Problem befasst: 
B 8,36 ou6EV Y«P <$> eaxiv r̂  e'axai 
aXAo irapEf; xou EOVXOS, ETTEI TO ye Motp ETrEfino'ev 
ouXov aKivnxov x"* EyEvai. xQ iTavx„ ovo]iJ Eaxai, 
oaaa 3poxoi KOXEOEVXO TTEiroiOrfxES Eivai aXnQfi, 
yxyveaQa\ XE Kai oAAuaQai, E'IVOI XE <a\ DUXI'-^ 
B 8,53 yop<f>as yap Kaxe0EVxo 6i5o yvtiSyas ovoya£siv.31 
B 19 ouxa) xoi KCLXOL <So£av £<j>u xaSs <ai vuv eaax 
Kai yEXEiTEix airo XOU6E xEXEUxncrouai xpa^EVxa. 
xo"?s r3 dvoy' av0panroi KOXEOEVX' Eirfanyov EKc(ax<j).32 
o'voya und avoya?Eiv sind hier die beherrschenden Ausdriicke, mit 
dem KaXEiv der andern Stellen bedeutungsgleich. Aus dem falschen 
Denken heraus (Kaxa 66,£av) haben die Menschen ihren Vorstellun-
gen Namen gegeben. Primar ist also auch hier^der menschliche 
Irrtum, der etwas fur wahr halt (ireiToi0ox£S Eivai aAn0ri), das 
es nicht gibt, und ihm daher einen Namen beilegt, der von der 
Wahrheit aus betrachtet nur ein Name ist. Wie ausgepragt und 
festsitzend dieser Gegensatz von aXf]0Eia und ovoya in Parmenides* 
Denken ist, zeigt B 8, 38, wo ovoy* ohne Zusatz "blosser Name" 
heisst, eine Bedeutung des Wortes, die sich sonst erst in der 
Sophistik wieder fmdet und auch dort meist nur in ausgespro-
chenem Gegensatz zu Epyov, TrpSyya o.a. Dennoch ist es zu 
scharf ausgedriickt, wenn man gesagt hat, Parmenides habe "die 
Benennung als Quelle des Irrtums" bezeichnet und "den Siinden-
fall der Menschheit mit der Sprache begmnen" lassen. Vielmehr 
ist das blinde Vertrauen auf die Erfahrung (e'oos TTOXOVEIPOV 
B 7, 3) das erste, die falsche Benennung erst ein daraus 
folgender einmaliger Akt (KOXEOEVXO) , der dann fiir die 
Folgezeit weiterwirkte und den Irrtum verewigte.33 
The one place in which Heinimann's account seems uncharacteristically 
weak is his attempt to explain the identification of the concept with the 
name as being "because thoughts are only comprehensible when they come to 
the surface--in language" (Weil Gedanken nur dort, wo sie an die Oberflache 
treten, d. h. eben in der Sprache, fassbar sind). Apart from the inherent 
vagueness of the metaphor "coming to the surface" the obviously intended 
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sense of the remark seems clearly false. Surely one can conceive of 
(comprehend) some individual or some property without conceiving of the 
name of that individual or property and without identifying the concept 
of the thing with the thing itself. 
Fortunately there is a much more plausible explanation readily avail-
able to us. It has been argued, most persuasively, perhaps, by Kirk and 
Raven in The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1960), that the idea of 
incorporeal existence was unimaginable to the Greek mind prior to Plato. 
Thus, while pre-platonic Greek thought clearly assumed the existence of 
mental entities such as thoughts, judgments and concepts, it could do so 
only by investing those entities with some physical properties. Thus it is 
natural to hypothesize that those mental entities, which were communicated 
and made known through a language which was in turn constituted by physical 
objects such as utterances and inscriptions, became real in pre-platonic 
thought by being identified with linguistic entities. 
Now one consequence of the foregoing account is that it is extremely 
unlikely, if not impossible, that anyone could have raised the question of 
whether names were "naturally" correct prior to the Sophists' rendering of 
the original appearance-versus-reality contrast as being between vo'yos and 
<(>uais. This is in no way due to a lack of terminology, for, as we have 
seen, there were terms which were used to mark this contrast long before 
the Sophists adopted vo'yos and ((JVCIS. What makes it so unlikely that the 
question could have been raised before, roughly, the latter half of the 
fifth century B.C., is the fact that such terms as ovoya and Xoyos which 
are at issue in the voyos/<j>u'cis dispute in the Cratylus are the very terms 
which had formerly marked the vo'yos side of that dispute. Thus to have 
raised the question of whether names are naturally or conventionally correct 
prior to the currency of vo'yos/̂ uois was to have asked such things as 
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whether ovoyaxa were Kaxa ovoya rather than Kaxa irpayya or ovoyaxi (or X6yjo) 
rather than E'PYUJ. Such questions would have been not only absurd but un-
answerable. Consequently, whoever first raised the question of the natural 
versus the conventional correctness of names was much more likely to have 
been a contemporary of Socrates and Euripides than of Parmenides or 
Heraclitus. 
Furthermore, since voyos was the immediate heir of ovoya, it is only 
natural to suppose that there was a strong initial presumption, even after 
the contrast between vo'yos and (jiu'ais became fashionable, against considering 
the possibility that ovoyaxa were <|>uaEis. This is borne out by the fact 
that in regard to this question most, if not all, Sophistic authors were, 
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at least implicitly, conventionalists. 
Thus, it is reasonably safe to conclude that by the time the voyos/̂ i/cris 
terminology became current at least the following three conditions obtained. 
(1) The concept of a thing had not yet been distinguished from the name of 
a thing. (2) There was a strong initial presumption that with respect to 
any naturally developed language, such as Greek, what made a name correct 
was simply the agreement of the native speakers of that language to call a 
certain thing, or kind of thing, by that name. (3) That which came under 
the heading of voyos was generally regarded to be arbitrary, subject to 
change by whim or fancy, and consequently, in principle untrustworthy as an 
indicator of what was true. From these three conditions we are able to 
provide a basis for constructing a plausible motive for the view that 
"there is a natural correctness of names." There is no difficulty in 
hypothesizing that among those to whom conditions (2) and (3) applied, 
there were at least some who saw among the consequences of those conditions 
the futility of any sort of rational inquiry, be it Sophistical or philo-
sophical. If, as seemed obvious, rational inquiry depended upon the mutual 
communication and mutual understanding of a language and the elements of 
that language, i.e., its nouns and verbs, in order to discover what was 
true, then the consequences of (2) and (3), which were that language was 
inherently corrupt, entailed that the rational inquiry being undertaken by 
means of language must also be corrupt. Thus the motive for seeking a 
natural correctness of names becomes the salvation not only of Sophistry 
and philosophy, but of all rational inquiry. Furthermore, an answer to the 
question why the salvation of rational inquiry should be sought for in 
vocal sounds is provided by condition (1). Because of the failure to dis-
tinguish the incorporeal concept from the corporeal name, the latter was 
expected to accomplish the impossible task of doing the work of both. Con-
sequently, the only conceivable alternative to a language in which truth 
was voyiij (because its elements, nouns and verbs, were correct vrfyu)) was a 
language whose elements were correct $oaei. And as long as condition (1) 
obtained, these elements could be nothing other than vocal sounds. More-
over, the consequences of accepting condition (1) could easily have led to 
a further consideration for seeking a solution in vocal sounds if we suppose 
that there were those who not only accepted condition (1) but, due to the 
influence of Heraclitus, accepted two additional conditions: (4) the pur-
pose of giving names to things and of combining nouns and verbs to make 
statements was to "distinguish each thing according to its nature and 
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declare how it is," and (5) the physical world of the senses was composed 
of objects which were constantly changing. The immediate effect of adding 
this last condition to condition (1) was the realization that for the vast 
majority of names the only things that they could name were physical 
objects which were constantly changing. But then, how was condition (4) to 
apply? How was one to determine the nature of a thing if there was no way 
of knowing, from one moment to the next, whether it would remain the same or 
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change, whether it would continue to exist or be destroyed? And how was 
one to declare how a thing was when as soon as one had declared it, the 
thing was (or might be) different from what it had been declared to be? 
What was obviously required, if condition (4) was to apply, was something 
permanent and abiding, upon which one could fix his attention in distinguish-
ing and declaring things. Now while physical objects, like horses and 
rivers, constantly changed, the names for these things appeared to remain 
the same and thus appeared to provide the required permanence. All that 
was further needed was the assumption that somehow the nature of the thing 
named was captured in and expressed by the name, and, therefore, knowable 
through it. To those governed by condition (1), this was neither a diffi-
cult nor an unreasonable assumption to make. 
It is, of course, a glaring weakness of the foregoing discussion that 
no concrete evidence has been presented which would tend to show that any 
of the above speculations are true. This need not be a crucial drawback, 
however, if we keep m mind that the original question which this section 
was concerned to answer was what motives could plausibly be ascribed to 
either a contemporary or a predecessor of Plato's for holding the view that 
names are correct by nature. Thus, a more telling criticism of the above 
account would be to show not that the speculations contained therein are 
unsupported, but that, within the accepted framework of our knowledge of 
Greek thought prior to Plato, they are implausible. 
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In the Seventh Letter, Plato, m order to illustrate the "weakness of 
language," says somewhat impatiently and completely without argument that 
"there is no reason why what we call 'circles' might not be called 'straight 
lines' and the straight lines 'circles,' and their natures will be none the 
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less fixed despite this exchange of names." It is clear that in this 
passage Plato is assuming that the question of the Cratylus is one for 
which there can be no doubt as to who is right. But if the Plato who wrote 
the Seventh Letter viewed the entire affair as simply a case of res ipsa 
loquitur, how do we account for the Plato who wrote the Cratylus? One of 
the most attractive features of the speculative account given in the pre-
ceding section is that it provides a ready explanation for both Platos. 
Regardless of how plausible its motives, or how compelling its reasoning, 
the conclusion of the naturalist argument, viz., that for each nameable 
there was a vocal sound which m virtue of nothing more than its auditory 
qualities correctly named that nameable, still must have appeared to many 
as absurd. The absurdity of such a view became most apparent when it tried 
to answer the question of how the auditory qualities of one vocal sound, 
more than those of any other, made discoverable the "nature" of some name-
able. An index to the kind of answer available to the naturalist is pro-
vided in the Cratylus by the mimetic theory Socrates is made to develop 
beginning at 422 E ff. That Plato himself considered this theory absurd is 
easily seen from the fact that he makes it a consequence of the theory that 
there will be as many correct names for a thing as there are metaphysical 
views regarding the nature of the thing (436 D ff.). Thus for a Heraclitean 
there would be one set of correct names, for an Eleatic another, for a 
Pythagorean still another, and so on. On this view, there is no longer any 
difference between naturalism and conventionalism, for in order to settle 
the question which of the competing names was the correct one, it would be 
necessary to settle the logically prior question which of the metaphysical 
views was the correct one, i.e., which of the metaphysical views provided 
the correct account of the nature of the nameables. It is quite obvious 
that in settling this question any appeal to the relevant auditory qualities 
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As soon as the question is viewed from a point of view not governed by 
condition (1), it is easily seen that the dilemma disappears. There is no 
longer any difficulty in conceding that the correctness of any vocal sound 
assigned to a nameable is purely a matter of convention as long as it is 
insisted that the concept* of that nameable which is the meaning of that 
vocal sound and which is the entity fully described by the string of vocal 
sounds which constitute the definition assigned to that vocal sound is not 
correctly framed or correctly understood by convention. That a concept is 
correctly framed or understood does not follow from its being the case that 
men believe or have agreed that it is correct, but rather from its being 
the case that to understand the concept is to know the nature of the name-
ables falling under that concept. In short, the correct vocal sound can be 
invented but the correct concept can only be discovered. 
By now it should be fairly obvious how the speculative account given 
in the preceding section provides an answer to the question of why Plato 
should have devoted an entire dialogue to the issue of the natural versus 
the conventional correctness of names. By assuming the truth of that 
speculative account at least three excellent reasons can be found for 
Plato's having written the Cratylus: (a) he would resolve the voyos/<j>oais 
dilemma over the correctness of names; (b) he would provide an answer to 
the Heraclitean problem concerning the permanence of any nameable; and (c) 
he could use (a) and (b) to construct a theory of language, which would 
further demonstrate the superior adequacy of his theory of Ideas to solve 
37 the philosophical problems of his day. Furthermore, if these were, in 
*"Concept" is here understood as all and only those entities which are 
capable of being understood but are capable neither of being sensed nor 
imagined, Such an understanding neither commits us to nor prevents us from 
considering concepts as "mental entities." 
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fact, Plato's reasons for writing the Cratylus, there is no longer any 
difficulty in accounting for his rejecting, in the Seventh Letter, the whole 
issue between Hermogenes and Cratylus as absurdly obvious. 
In the subsequent chapters I shall attempt to develop an interpretation 
of the Cratylus based on the two assumptions that the speculative account 
of the preceding section is true and, consequently, that three of Plato's 
motives for writing the Cratylus were (a), (b), and (c). 
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oxi xns KpaxoXou 6^gns y{-
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abstract from them the basic sense which they share and to 
ascertain those subtleties of meaning m which they differ, 
and so to attain to orthotes in onomata, a kind of right dis-
tinction of two similar words. This concept must be regarded 
as quite distinct from xnv (|>uaei <3p0oxnxa ovcfyaxos (Cra., 391 
A3), a formulation that presumably represents the view of the 
Heraclitean Cratylus: the natural and proper meaning of any 
given single word, to be discovered by enquiring into its 
"nature." Prodicus, on the other hand, so far as can be 
seen from the material at our disposal, never defines words 
individually, but invariably takes two at a time, considers 
them side by side, and indicates their points of difference; 
or, to put it in a slightly different way, he asks not: 
"What on earth is X?" but "In what respect is X different 
from Y?" . . . . 
Classen, despite his mention of the Cratylus, seems either to have 
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And the one who is called Iris is actually a cloud, purple and fiery 
red and yellow to behold. 
27 We call the reflection of the sun in the clouds a rainbow. 
28 
But [the name] which right requires they do not use, but by custom 
I too apply these names. 
29 
[The Greeks] are wrong to recognize coming into being and perishing; 
for nothing comes into being nor perishes but is rather compounded or dis-
solved from things that are. So they would be right to call coming into 
being composition and perishing dissolution. 
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For nothing other, besides being, either is or will be, since Destiny 
fettered it to be whole and unmovable; therefore all that mortals posited 
convinced that it is true will be [mere] name, coming into being and perish-
ing, to be and not to be, change of place and exhange of brilliant color. 
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So, according to belief, these things were born and now are, and 
from now on they will grow and will afterwards perish. For each of them 
men posited a distinctive name. 
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37 The nature and importance of the theory of ideas in the Cratylus has 
been one of the more controversial issues surrounding the dialogue. To my 
knowledge, however, no one has yet argued that the theory is completely 
absent in the Cratylus. The controversy seems to center on the question of 
how fully developed is the version of the theory which does appear in the 
Cratylus. With respect to this issue I am somewhat gratified in being sup-
ported by what is probably the most recent piece on the topic, J. V. Luce's 
"The Theory of Ideas In Plato's Cratylus" (Phronesis X, 1965). Luce, who 
argues primarily from evidence internal to the Cratylus, concludes as follows: 
In conclusion, let me summarise my main contentions. I 
have argued that x̂ pioyb's is not in evidence in the Cratylus, 
but allowed that the stage is set for it to appear. The dis-
cussion of craftsmanship in [389 A - 390 E] contains m germ 
the "one over many" argument for the existence of the Ideas. 
The argument of [439 D - end] approximates to the "argument 
from the sciences," but with the emphasis on the permanence 
rather than on the non-sensible nature of the object of knowl-
edge. These two key passages therefore exhibit Plato's thought 
at an important transitional stage. In (A) he is occupied in 
forging together two convergent, but initially separate, lines 
of enquiry. The logical function which elSos had acquired in 
his dialectic of definition is combined with the Socratic 
doctrine of functional excellence (̂ pyov and EUirpaf;ia). The 
EI6OS then becomes the norm of craftsmanship, and, as the norm 
prescribed by (jitfois not voyos is on the way to becoming a sub-
stantial 7rapa6Eiyya EV xp $uoei. In (B) xo KaXo'v and xo aya0o'v, 
of whose objectivity Plato, following Socrates, had never been 
in doubt, are brought into strong contrast with the Flusslehre 
fathered by Heraclitus, developed by his school, and apparent-
ly justified by the linguistic speculations of Cratylus. In 
this context their function as norms of conduct ceases to be 
prominent, and they are invested instead with the character 
of permanence which, in Plato's view, is the prerequisite of 




One of the most controversial issues concerning the Cratylus, and 
certainly the most controversial among modern scholars, is the question of 
what the dialogue is supposed to be about. The following will serve to 
suggest how divergent are the views of not only competent but eminent Plato 
scholars with respect to this question: 
It embodies the oldest speculations known to us respect-
ing the origin, the mode of signification and the function of 
words as instruments. (George Grote, Plato and the Other 
Companions of Socrates, Vol. II, London, 1865, p. 551.) 
The dialogue is about etymologies, and in the main 
nothing else. (W. D. Ross, "The Date of Plato's Cratylus," 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 9, 1955, p. 191.) 
The main theme of the Cratylus is obviously the relation 
of language to thought and reality. (Paul Shorey, What Plato 
Said, Chicago, 1965, p. 219.) 
The avowed purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the 
origin of language . . . [which] is a pretext leading to the 
metaphysical distinction between substance and appearance. 
(Wmcenty Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's 
Logic, Longman Greens, London, 1897, p. 228.) 
In the Cratylus Plato is very much in his Lewis Carroll 
vein. Socrates is asked to intervene in an argument between 
Cratylus and Hermogenes. Hermogenes maintains a convention-
alist view of language. The proper meaning of a word is what 
it is used to stand for: to have meaning is to be used con-
sistently. This Cratylus disputes, though the grounds on 
which he disputes it are not very clear. Socrates seems to 
favour a compromise solution according to which conventional 
usage, is all that is strictly necessary for signification, 
but certain sounds are none the less naturally suited to 
carry certain meanings, so that it is better that these 
sounds should be used for these meanings, To this he adds 
the stipulation that in a well-made language the relations 
between sounds should reflect the relations which hold 
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between the types of things they signify. Thus "dogfish" 
should not be used for dogfish unless they are, as it implies, 
in some way a doggy kind of fish. 
But this discussion is used, Carroll-wise, as a thread on 
which to hang a great many light-hearted allusions to philo-
sophical views. (I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's 
Doctrines, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, Vol. II, 
p. 475.) 
Why should the question of the Cratylus's subject matter admit such 
diverse and even inconsistent answers? In the opening passage, the reader 
is told quite specifically, what the characters in the dialogue are going 
to talk about. The dispute which Socrates is invited to mediate is about 
names, but it is not just any aspect of names which is at issue, it is 
their correctness. Similarly, it is not any and every question about the 
correctness of names which is to be entertained, but only whether that 
correctness is derived "by nature" or "by convention." One needs only a 
casual acquaintance with the rest of the dialogue in order to determine 
that this rather specific question remains throughout as the mam topic of 
conversation. The only explanation I can give for so many competent 
scholars refusing to accept Plato's own words and instead looking either 
behind or between those words to "find" such things as an account of the 
origin of Language (!), an anticipation of the use theory of meaning, a 
pretext leading to metaphysical distinctions, a narrative of Socrates in 
Wonderland, etc., is their failure to come up with a satisfactory answer to 
the question of why Plato should have devoted an entire dialogue to nothing 
more than the seemingly absurd topic of the natural versus the conventional 
correctness of names. However, if the speculative account given in the 
previous chapter has the plausibility we have claimed for it, then there is 
no compelling reason to suppose that Plato could not have been seriously 
and philosophically interested in such a topic. Furthermore, even if we 
grant that our speculative account is just as likely to be false as it is 
Unfortunately the Cratylus offers no explicit answers to these ques-
tions. The problem of giving an exact characterization of ovoyaxa does not 
arise in the Cratylus and Plato makes the participants in the dialogue 
appear to take the meaning of ovoya for granted. The only passages in 
Plato's writings which appear to shed some light on the matter occur in the 
Sophist. Toward the end of that dialogue, the Stranger is asked to dis-
tinguish between ovo'yaxa and £nyaxa. 
STR.—We have two kinds of vocal indications of being (xtov 
xp <|>a>vp irEpi xnv ouoi'av SnXojyctxwv), one called ovo'yaxa 
the other (SnWxa. 
THEAT.—Define each of them. 
STR.—That which designates (xb (SnXuya) an action we may call a 
Pnya . . . . And the vocal sign applied to whatever is 
the doer of that action we may call an ftvoya.7 
Since part of the purpose in assigning this definition to o'voya is to dis-
tinguish it from iSfiya, we can immediately rule out the possibility that 
Plato is here using it in any generic sense. However, just prior to giving 
these definitions, Plato justifies Robinson's claims about the ambiguity of 
ovoya by giving it roughly the sense of "word." 
STR.—Then let us now make an inquiry concerning ovoydxaiv, 
just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; 
for in that direction the object of our present 
search is coming m sight. 
THEAT. What do we need to understand about ovoyaxwv? 
STR.—Whether they all unite with one another or none of 
them, or some will and some will not. 
THEAT.—Evidently the last; some will and some will not. 
STR.—This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are 
spoken in order and mean something do unite, but 
those that mean nothing in their sequence do not 
unite.^ 
The characteristic Plato attributes to the ovo'yaxa in this passage is 
one which he expressly excludes from those ovo'yaxa which designate "what-
ever is the doer of an action." Thus, he says that the sequence "lion," 
"stag," "horse," will not unite of themselves but only when they are com-
< / 9 
bined with pnyaxa. Clearly then, there are at least two distinct senses 
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that Plato actually held such a simple-minded view forces us to distinguish 
what Plato did say from what he would have said had he been more careful. 
I suggest that if Plato had been confronted with these difficulties, he 
would have emended his definition of ovoya as follows: "an 6'voya is a 
vocal sign applied to whatever is capable of acting or being acted upon." 
This overcomes our first objection and is in keeping with what Plato says 
about ovoyaxa in the Cratylus and elsewhere. But in overcoming the first 
objection, it seems to raise a second^ namely, how can such a definition 
apply to adjectives9 The answer is simply this: just as in English we can 
nominalize any adjective by adding the suffix "-ness," so m Greek any 
adjective may be nominalized by putting before it the definite article. 
The instances of this in Plato are too numerous to mention and I shall cite 
only one. In the Phaedo, Socrates is made to comment " . . . ifEp\ xSv ofyd&pa 
ayiKpulv Kai yEyaXuv." Clearly adjectives used in this way (e.g., as in 
the sentence "Largeness in a man increases strength") would come within the 
scope of our emended definition. Hence, this definition has the twofold 
virtue of being free from any obvious objections and of being applicable to 
all and only those grammatical types which are found among the examples 
given in the Cratylus. For this reason, I suggest that the definition, "a 
vocal sign applied to whatever is capable of acting or being acted upon," 
completely characterizes an ovoya insofar as it is used in the Cratylus. 
Taken in this sense, Professor Robinson is quite correct in saying that 
ovoya has no exact English equivalent. I shall therefore, throughout the 
rest of this essay, adlpt the suggestion of "name" and stipulate that it is 
to be defined exactly like ovoya. 
The aspect of names at issue in the Cratylus is their "correctness." 
For Plato, the question of the correctness of names is essentially the 
question of determining what sort of relations must be assumed to hold 
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between a name and its nominate in order to account for the fact that it is 
12 
meaningful to ask of any given nominate what its correct name is. The 
dialogue begins with an account of a dispute between Hermogenes and Cratylus 
over this question. 
HER: Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that every-
thing has a right name (ovo'yaxos op8o'xnta) of its own, 
which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever 
people call a thing by agreement (£uv0EyEVoi), just a 
piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that 
there is a kind of inherent correctness (op0o'xnTa 
Tr£<j)UKUiav) in names, which is the same for all men, 
both Greeks and barbarians.13 
Professor Robinson has taken the view attributed here to Cratylus to 
be the same "nature theory of names" which is put into the mouth of Socrates 
later in the dialogue. However, the view as it is expressed here can be 
interpreted in at least four different ways: (1) for every nominate, there 
is exactly one name which is "naturally" correct and is the same for any 
speaker regardless of the language he speaks; (2) for every nominate, there 
is, in any particular natural language, exactly one name which is naturally 
correct and the principle of correctness by which that name is determined 
is the same for every language; (3) for every nominate, there is at least 
one name which is naturally correct and this is the same for every language; 
(4) for every nominate, there is in any particular natural language at 
least one name which is naturally correct and the principle of correctness 
by which that name is determined is the same for all languages. 
I shall show later that only (4) is consistent with the "nature theory 
of names" subsequently developed by Socrates. However, any attempt to 
determine which of the four interpretations Cratylus is actually made to 
hold must be put off until we are able to examine more clearly the sections 
toward the end of the dialogue dealing with Cratylus's position. 
The essential feature of Cratylus's view, no matter which interpreta-
tion of it we choose, is the claim that names are correct "by nature" 
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Ofiuoei) . Such a view entails that every nominate has a right name in-
dependently of what men may choose to call it. This is contradictory to 
the position advocated by Hermogenes that a name is "whatever people call a 
thing by convention, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing." 
Thus the crux of the controversy seems to be whether names are correct by 
nature or by convention (SuvSEysvoi 383A, ouvSnKn 384D, 434E). 
The argument of the Cratylus begins with an examination of Hermogenes's 
conventionalism. This position, barely stated m the opening passage, is now 
elaborated on. 
HER: . . . I have often talked with Cratylus and many others 
and cannot come to the conclusion that there is any cor-
rectness of names other than convention and agreement 
(£uv0nKn Kai (SyoXoyi'a). For it seems to me that what-
ever name you give to a thing is its right name; and if 
you give up that name and change it for another, the 
later name is no less correct than the earlier, just as 
we change the names of our servants; for I think no name 
belongs to any particular thing by nature, but only by 
the custom and habit (vo'y<y KO\ E6EI) of those who use 
and call things by names (xcov E0ioavxtov XE Kai KaXoifvxwv). *5 
. . . I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and 
you by another which you gave. And in the same way, I 
see that states have their own different names for the 
same things, and Greeks differ from barbarians in their 
use of names.1° 
From these passages it should be evident that Hermogenes's theory is 
neither as straightforwardly unequivocal nor as intuitively plausible as it 
originally seemed. What is not so evident is where the source of our un-
easiness lies. Grote, one of the most careful of Plato's commentators, has 
claimed that Hermogenes is made to hold two separate opinions about the 
correctness of names, the second of which contradicts the first. According 
to Grote, these two opinions are: "1. That names are significant by habit 
and convention and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any 
17 name which he pleases to any object." The basis of the contradiction is 
that 
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It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual 
communication and information among persons living in society; 
which purpose they would not serve if each individual gave a 
different name to the same object . . . . The purposes of 
naming would no longer be answered if this were done.18 
Considered as a criticism of Hermogenes's conventionalism, Grote's 
point is well taken, but in saying that the notion of purpose is implicit 
in Hermogenes's remarks, he is simply mistaken. To make sense of Grote's 
view that Hermogenes is guilty of a contradiction it must be supposed that 
the alleged implication is drawn from the first of Hermogenes's two opinions, 
namely that names are significant by habit and convention. It is difficult 
to see clearly how such an opinion could by itself imply that "names are to 
serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons 
living m society." What Grote seems to have m mind is that such an 
implication is inherent in the very notion of £uv0nKn when applied to 
naming. Thus the two contradictory views which Grote attributes to 
Hermogenes are: (1) the correctness of names depends on certain conventions 
which are adopted for the purpose of mutual information and communication, 
and (2) the correctness of names depends on the choice of whoever "uses and 
calls things by names" and need not be for any purpose whatever. Grote's 
error lies in assuming that the notion of £uv6riKn cannot be made applicable 
in the case of (2). As I shall show, this assumption is not only false, it 
begs the question. In the long passage quoted above, Hermogenes is made to 
say that he "cannot come to the conclusion that there is any correctness of 
names other than 5uv0rfKn and oyoXoyia. For (yap) it seems to me that what-
ever name you give to a thing is its right name (my underlining). There is 
the possibility that Hermogenes has simply contradicted himself here but it 
is equally plausible to suppose that he is illustrating the notions £uv0nKn 
and oyoXoyia (hence the yap). Grote's choice of the'former view requires 
justification if it is to be more than arbitrary. It turns out, however, 
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that the evidence favors the latter view. Near the end of the dialogue, 
Socrates, after identifying convention with custom (s0os) asks, "Do you not 
19 mean by custom that when I speak I have a definite meaning and you recog-
20 
nize that I have that meaning?" The implication of this question is that 
it takes at least two people to establish a semantic convention, which would 
lend support to Grote's view. However, immediately following this question, 
Socrates goes on to ask: 
Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is an 
indication given to you by me . . . . The indication comes 
from something which is unlike my meaning when I speak, if in 
your example, OKXnpoxns the lambda is unlike hardness; and if 
this is true, did you not make a convention with yourself and 
so derive the correctness of a name conventionally?21 
Here Plato appears explicitly to recognize the logical possibility of one's 
making a semantic convention with himself. The implication of this is that 
in Plato's view Hermogenes is not guilty of any contradictions. For Plato 
as well as Hermogenes, conventions were establishable both by groups of 
people and by private individuals. 
The chief difficulty with Hermogenes's theory lies in his failure to 
distinguish properly between these two types of convention. The crucial 
distinction is this: m the case of the first (conventions established by 
groups), there is a public criterion for correctness, the correct name 
being the agreed upon name, while in the case of the second no such public 
criterion exists. Hermogenes's claim that private individuals can establish 
their own private semantic conventions, a view which Professor Kretzmann has 
labeled "the doctrine of autonomous idiolects," actually denies that there 
is any correctness of names. To the question, "what is the right name of 
such-and-such," the reply, "any name you care to choose" is not an answer, 
22 
but a rejection of the question. 
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The implications of this distinction now become clear. Even if we 
allow that both types of convention are equally genuine, it could never be 
the case that one could serve as a paradigm for the other. If I were to 
make a convention "with myself" to call hairless bipeds "sunflowers" (in my 
private language game in which I reassigned various nouns), such a conven-
tion could never be binding. I could at any time, and for any reason, have 
a change of heart and decide (make a new convention with myself) to call 
them "lampshades." But if I agreed as a member of a group to adopt the 
convention of calling hairless bipeds "sunflowers," that convention would 
be binding on me in the following way: if I should in the future attempt 
to call them "lampshades," I would lay myself open to the charge "you do 
not call hairless bipeds by their right (agreed upon) name." Thus each of 
the two types of conventions carries with it a different set of consequences 
and what is true of one type is not necessarily true of the other. 
On the basis of the foregoing, we are now able to say precisely where 
Hermogenes's theory goes wrong. The implausibility of Hermogenes's theory 
lies in his thinking that "I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, 
and you by another, which you gave, and, in the same way (ouxu) 6E Kai, my 
underlining), I see that states have their own different names for the same 
things, and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their 
23 use of names." 
In holding the mistaken view that Hermogenes's theory breaks down into 
two contradictory theories, Grote is led to commit a further error. The 
two contradictory theses which Grote thought he had uncovered were: "(1) 
that names are significant by habit and convention and not by nature" (i.e., 
names are the products of conventional agreements adopted by groups of 
people for the purpose of mutual communication), and (2) that each man may 
and can give any name which he pleases to any object." Grote maintains 
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that the attempt to refute Hermogenes's theory which is now begun by 
Socrates is really directed against thesis (1). I will attempt to show 
that Socrates not only fails to refute thesis (1), but at least part of his 
failure can be attributed to the fact that he refuses to discuss the most 
crucial assumption of that thesis and, as a consequence, the "nature theory 
of names" that Socrates develops is, vis-a-vis thesis (1), nothing more 
than an alternative. 
Socrates does, however, discuss thesis (2) and produces both a good 
and a bad argument against it. The bad argument is this: since statements 
(Xoyos, 385 B) are either true or false, the parts of statements must be 
true or false. Now a name is a part of a statement; therefore names are 
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either true or false. Robinson had pointed out that this argument commits 
the fallacy of division and has rightly suggested that Plato did not intend 
for it to be taken seriously. What makes it almost certain that Plato 
himself did not take the argument seriously is the use to which he puts it. 
There can be little doubt that the proper conclusion which Plato intended 
the reader to draw from this passage is that Hermogenes is, to borrow Pro-
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fessor Crombie's delightfully evocative expression, "a noodle." Given 
that it is possible for anyone to name falsely (385 C), it obviously follows 
that one cannot correctly give to a thing any name he chooses. However, 
instead of drawing this obvious conclusion, Socrates is made to foist upon 
Hermogenes the conclusion that: 
Therefore (apa) whatever each particular person says is the 
name of anything, that is its name for that person.28 
It is hardly conceivable that Plato was unaware of the absurdity of 
this conclusion. Consequently, it is only on the assumption that Plato was 
deliberately portraying an intellectually inept Hermogenes (who assents to 
a conclusion which not only does not follow from unsound premises, but 
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which is the contradictory of the conclusion which does so follow) that the 
passage becomes intelligible. 
The good argument which Socrates produces against thesis (1) appears 
as part of a much longer argument by which Socrates attempts to prove to 
29 
Hermogenes that "names belong to things by nature." As a starting point, 
Hermogenes is made to accept the premise that both wise and foolish men 
exist. From this, Socrates infers that "real things" (xa ovxa) must have 
"some fixed reality of their own (auxaSv xiva BsBaioxnxa T$S 0601'as, 386 A) 
not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, swaying one way 
and another in accordance with our fancy (<j>avxaoyaxi), but exist of them-
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selves in relation to their own reality imposed by nature." Otherwise we 
would have to admit the truth of either Protagoras's theory that man is the 
measure of all things, or Euthydemus's theory that "all things belong 
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equally to all men at the same time and perpetually," and both of these 
are inconsistent with the already admitted premise that men are both wise 
and foolish. But if things have their own fixed nature, surely actions 
must also have a fixed nature since actions too are real things (xuv 
OVXOJV) . Now speaking is an action and naming is one form of speaking 
(xou XEYEIV yo'piov xo ovoya£Eiv), therefore naming is also an action. It 
follows then that naming must be done in the "natural" way and not accord-
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m g to our inclination (£ouXn0Su£v). Furthermore, actions require not 
only an agent and a patient but an instrument (o'pyavov) and in the act of 
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naming this is the name. Since a name is an instrument, it becomes 
necessary to determine what it is an instrument for. A name is an instru-
ment for "teaching one another" (6i6aa<oyE'v xi aXXnXous) and "separating 
reality" (6iaKpixiKov xfis ouoias). Now those who use an instrument in 
carrying out an action use the work of the artisan who made the instrument 
and who needs to have the proper skill if he is to make his instrument 
well. He who has the skill in giving (0eo0ai) names is the lawgiver 
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(voyo0£xns), the "rarest of all artisans." 
Like any true craftsman (6np*oupy(3v), the lawgiver has in mind a model 
on which he patterns his work. This model is the Form or Ideal (auxo bs 
Eoxiv 389B„ EI60s 389Bin) of that instrument. In making his instrument, 
the craftsman attempts to embody this form in his material. Thus the law-
giver or name-maker must know how to embody m the vocal sounds (̂ eoyyous) 
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and syllables (ouXXaBas) the ideal of the name. However, it is still 
necessary to determine whether or not the craftsman has done his work 
properly. He who is best able to determine this is the user. In the case 
of names, the user best qualified to do this is the dialectician who, by 
knowing how to ask the right questions and to give the right replies, is 
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able to "separate things according to their natures." Therefore, if the 
name-giver is able to give to each thing the name which is naturally suited 
to it and the dialectician is able to determine whether or not that name is 
correct, then not only must the relation between names and their nominates 
be a natural one, but also these relations must be discoverable. 
The following is an abstract of the nature-theory argument: 
1. Men are both wise and foolish. (386 B) 
2. Real things have their own nature independently of the 
nature men may give them. (386 D) 
3. Actions are real things. (386 E) 
(2,3) 4. Actions have their own nature. (387 A) 
5. Speaking is an action. (387 A) 
6. Naming is a kind of speaking. (387 C) 
(2,5,6) 7. Naming must be done according to its own nature and not as 
we choose. (387 D) 
8. An action requires not only an agent and a patient but an 
instrument. (387 D) 
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9. In naming the instrument used is a name. (388 A) 
10. A name is an instrument for teaching one another and for 
separating reality. (388 B) 
11. He who makes an instrument has the requisite skill and not 
everyone has this skill. (388 C-D) 
12. Instruments can be both well and badly made. (388 C) 
13. He who is skilled in making names is the lawgiver. (388 E) 
(11,12,13) 14. Not every man can make names well, but only the lawgiver, 
who is the rarest of all artisans. (389 A) 
15. An artisan proceeds according to a model on which he 
patterns his work. (389 A-C) 
16. What serves as the model is the Ideal or Form of the 
instrument. (389 B) 
17. The Ideal or Form of an instrument exists by nature and 
cannot be determined by men's choice, (suppressed) 
(15.16,17) 18. The task of the artisan is to embody this natural Form in 
the material out of which he makes his instrument. (389 C) 
19. The material out of which names are made are sounds and 
syllables. (389 D) 
(14,18,19) 20. The task of the lawgiver is to embody in sounds and 
syllables the Ideal name which is naturally suited to each 
object. (389 D) 
21. Whether or not the artisan's product is well made is 
determined by the user. (390 B) 
22. The user of names is the dialectician. (389 C) 
(21.22) 23. The dialectician supervises the lawgiver in order to insure 
that the lawgiver's work is done correctly. (390 D) 
(20.23) 24. The relation between a name and its nominate is a natural 
one and is capable of being discovered. (390 E) 
/, 25. To discover the correct name of any nominate is to discover 
the name which is imposed on it by nature. (391 A-B) 
In order to understand fully the logic of Socrates's argument, it is 
necessary first of all to understand the important difference (which Plato 
never makes explicit) between using (xpnxai) a name and giving (0E08ai) a 
name. The user of names is one who, in speaking, "calls things by name" 
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(385 D) while the giver of names determines which things are to be called 
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by which names. It is in this sense that the "teacher" and the "dialec-
tician" use names and the "lawgiver" gives them. This distinction plays an 
important part in the interpretation of the first section of the argument 
from which Socrates deduces premise (7). In reading this section, one 
easily loses sight of this distinction due to the fact that Plato calls the 
action in question (ovoya?£iv) which can mean either using or giving a 
45 name. It is therefore no small matter to be able to say which of the two 
meanings Plato had in mind in (1) - (7), for not only the content but the 
soundness of the argument depends on which one we choose. 
While Plato never says explicitly how he is using ovoyaJjEiv, the fol-
lowing passage leaves no room for doubt. 
SOC. And again, what has to be cut, we said, has to be cut 
with something. 
HER. Certainly. 
SOC. And what has to be woven, has to be woven with something, 
and what has to be bored, has to be bored with something? 
HER. Certainly. 
SOC. And then what has to be named, has to be named with 
something9 
HER. True. 
SOC. And what is that with which we have to bore? 
HER. A borer. 
SOC. And that with which we weave? 
HER. A shuttle. 
SOC. And that with which we must name? 
HER. A name. 
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SOC. Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument. 
The point of this analogy is clearly that in naming, as in other 
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actions, one must use the proper instrument. In other words, what is being 
made to appear analogous here are the actions in which the instruments are 
used, not the actions by which the instruments are produced. Consequently, 
in making a name the instrument of "naming" Plato does not mean to say that 
names are the instruments for making (or giving) names, just as he does not 
mean to say that shuttles are instruments for making shuttles. But just as 
we do use a shuttle to weave, so we use a name to designate "that which 
acts or is acted upon." 
Once it becomes clear that by ovoyassiv, Plato has in mmd using a 
name, it can be shown that premises (1) - (7) constitute a sound argument 
47 against thesis (2). Assuming that it is correct to say that the user of 
a name is one who calls things by name, then what premise (7) says, in 
effect, is that we cannot call things by names in any way we choose, but we 
must do it m the way prescribed by nature. (While it is not made clear at 
this point what this way is, it follows from premise (2) that this way can-
not be consistent with thesis (2) since thesis (2) entails that there is no 
natural way of calling things by name.) 
While premise (7) says that the using of names must be done according 
to nature, it does not say, nor does it imply, that names themselves are 
naturally correct (see below, p. 62, n. 35). Given that premise (7) suc-
cessfully eliminates thesis (2) from contention, there still remain two 
possibilities. Either names are "naturally" related to their nominates, or 
thesis (1) is correct. Thus, in order to establish the nature-theory of 
names, Socrates's argument has to refute thesis (1). I propose to show 
that the argument does not do this and, consequently, Socrates fails to 
establish the nature-theory of names. 
My argument depends simply on showing that Hermogenes is not required 
to accept premise (11). Socrates attempts to establish premise (11) by 
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arguing that since certain instrument-makers, such as the carpenter and the 
smith, have special distinguishing skills, then any instrument-maker, includ-
ing the maker of names, must have a special distinguishing skill. This 
argument simply flies in the face of thesis (1). According to thesis (1), 
names are given by groups of people agreeing to use the name in a certain 
way for purposes of mutual communication. (A possibility which Socrates 
never considers in constructing the nature-theory argument.) Thus, suppos-
ing Hermogenes to be aware of the difference between thesis (1) and thesis 
(2), it is perfectly within reason here for him to raise the following 
objection: "I fail to see, Socrates, why you think the name-giver must have 
some special distinguishing skill. In thesis (1), I suggested that correct 
names are established by groups or people who simply agree to use the names 
in a certain way. You have not offered any argument for rejecting this 
view. Now if this view were true, I don't see how you could maintain that 
the name-maker needs some special skill. Almost everyone is capable of 
making an agreement and for those who do not have this capability, there is 
usually some ready explanation such as being a child or an idiot or some 
such thing. I'm not sure I even know, Socrates, what it would mean to say 
of someone that he has little or no skill in agreeing. Therefore, I will 
accept your claim that all instrument-makers, including the maker of names, 
must have some special skill, but first you must convince me that thesis 
(1) is false." It is easily seen that if premise (11) can be denied, then 
Socrates's argument cannot be a sound one, for if (11) can be denied, then 
(12); and if (12), then (14); if (14), then (20); if (20), then (24); and 
if (24), then (25). It turns out then that if we can consistently deny 
premise (11), we can consistently deny the conclusion of the argument. 
Thus Socrates has failed to establish that names are naturally correct. 
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The significance of this failure, however, depends on whether or not 
Plato meant for his readers to consider the nature-theory argument in its 
present form both valid and sound. The likelihood of this being true is, 
at best, remote. On the contrary, at 435 B-C, he explicitly denies the 
conclusion of the nature-theory argument by producing a thoroughly convinc-
ing counter-argument for the claim that convention is, in fact, a principle 
of correctness for names. One is hard put to give a plausible interpreta-
tion of this passage on the assumption that Plato considered the nature-
theory argument sound. But if we take away that assumption, we are forced 
to ask the following question: if Plato knew the nature-theory argument to 
be unsound, why does he bother to put it into the Cratylus? Part of the 
answer to this question is suggested by considering Plato's skill as a 
dramatist. The nature-theory argument is not the only argument in the 
Cratylus which is not intended to be taken seriously. We have already seen 
one such argument in the case of Socrates's claiming to have established 
that names are true or false on the ground that they are parts of true or 
false statements. Even more flagrant instances occur at 392 E, 423 C, and 
439 A. In these latter cases, it is Socrates himself who is made to point 
out the flaws in the argument. Putting these deliberately flawed arguments 
into Socrates's mouth enables Plato, by means of a single literary device, 
to illustrate with superb comic effectiveness the intellectual ineptness of 
Socrates's two respondents. By portraying Hermogenes and, as will sub-
sequently appear, Cratylus, as giving their assent, time and again, to 
these arguments, Plato conveys to the reader the unmistakable impression 
that neither of these two gentlemen is even vaguely aware of the implica-
tions of what they assent to and consequently can be made to assent to 
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almost anything. Socrates, who is of course fully aware of the situation, 
reacts in characteristic fashion. In the case of the nature-theory argument, 
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this device enables Plato to achieve a delightful piece of irony in the 
dialogue's "plot." In the beginning of the dialogue, Hermogenes and 
Cratylus are strongly committed to what appear to be contradictory views on 
the nature of names. As a result of Socrates's nature-theory argument, 
Hermogenes is convinced to give up the conventionalist view and accept the 
naturalist one. However, when Cratylus later asserts that Socrates's 
naturalist view is much to his liking, Socrates forces Cratylus, by showing 
him the implications of this view, to accept the conventionalist view. 
Thus, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates, on departing, urges Hermogenes 
and Cratylus to walk together for a while, leaving them to thrash the 
matter out according to whatever views they may now hold. 
But this account, if correct, explains only how Plato could have 
written a nature-theory argument into the Cratylus while knowing it to be 
unsound. It does not explain why he wrote in this particular argument 
rather than some other. If all Plato had in mind was to construct just any 
bad argument for the nature-theory, he surely could have devised one which 
was much less subtle and much more simple without sacrificing any of the 
dramatic effect. Why, then, does he choose to construct this one? The 
answer to this question is, I believe, crucial for an adequate understanding 
of the Cratylus. However, for reasons which will, I hope, be made clear 
below, a full and final answer must be put off until a later chapter. At 
this point, it is not possible to do more than provide a little stage-
setting. 
To begin to answer the question, it is necessary to understand that 
the chief philosophical task Plato sets himself in the Cratylus is to 
develop (albeit in a roundabout way) a theory of names. One very important 
reason why Plato constructed the nature-theory argument the way he did was 
to introduce two of the central notions in that theory, namely vo'yos and 
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voyoSExns, law and the lawgiver. Unfortunately, since Plato chooses to 
wait until the final third of the dialogue to begin to put the various 
parts of the theory together, the task of describing how Plato uses the 
notions of law and the lawgiver must be put off until we have some idea 
of what that theory is. 
We can, however, greatly reduce this task by forestalling certain mis-
conceptions, which may arise or have already arisen concerning these two 
notions. Plato introduces the notion of vo'yos into the nature-theory 
argument in the following way: 
SOC. And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the 
names we use? 
HER. No. 
SOC. Do you not think it is the law (vo'yos) that gives 
(Trapa6i6ous) them to us?49 
Strangely enough, Socrates offers neither explanation nor argument for 
this obscure remark. Aside from the fact that it is by no means clear how 
vo'yos gives us the names we use, there is the further difficulty m seeing 
how this statement could, under any interpretation, serve as a premise in 
an argument designed to show that names are naturally correct. In a passage 
quoted above, Hermogenes was made to say: 
I think no name belongs to any particular thing by nature 
(<f>i)0£i) but only by the convention (voyy) and custom of those 
who use and call things by name. 
In the present context, what strikes us about this passage is that in 
appealing to vo'yos as a principle for establishing the correctness of 
names, Hermogenes appears to be asserting the contrary of the proposition 
that names are correct by nature. In other words, Hermogenes uses the word 
voyos to mean the exact opposite of <j>uois. In championing voyos against 
its antithesis <|>u0is, Hermogenes is, of course, merely taking sides in the 
longest and most famous controversy in antiquity. Given the historical 
background described m the previous chapter, there is little chance that 
Hermogenes is doing violence to the word vo'yos as it was then ordinarily 
understood. 
Professor Morrow has written a passage which serves as an excellent 
summary of the account given in Chapter I concerning the state of that 
controversy during the age of Socrates. 
The contrast between nomos and physis is therefore un-
mistakable. Nomos varies from place to place and from time 
to time, whereas physis has the character of necessity (ava'YKn) 
and is therefore invariable. Nomos is transitory, while physis 
is "ageless and deathless." Nomos is the product of human 
contriving; but the forces at work m nature, and the order 
they bring about, are independent of human agency. Further-
more physis is primary, not merely in the order of being, but 
also in time; for nomos, together with all other human insti-
tutions, is a late occurrence in cosmic history. A fragment 
of Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras, tells us that living 
beings arose "where the warm and the cold were first mingled 
together in the earth; men were then separated off from the 
other animals, and set up kings and laws and the arts and 
cities and all the rest." For all these reasons physis came 
inevitably to be identified with the real and the true, 
whereas nomos is merely convention, what is accepted or 
acknowledged, whether rightly or wrongly. The culminating 
import of this antithesis between physis and nomos is revealed 
to us best m the famous fragment of Democritus: "By con-
vention (voyy) there is sweet, by convention there is bitter; 
by convention there is hot, by convention there is cold; by 
convention there is color, but in truth (EXE^) there are 
atoms and the void." Thus nomos comes to stand for the whole 
complex of human opinions, beliefs, and traditions; and the 
contrast between nomos and physis is generalized into a 
distinction between popular belief and what we would call 
scientific understanding. The former is relative, transitory, 
and unstable, whereas the latter is sure and abiding, since 
it rests upon the real nature of things.51 
How, then, could Plato hope to make vo'yos not only consistent with 
<j>uois but also, with respect to names, use vo'yos as a basis for establish-
ing <J>uais? This is a serious question and it is somewhat surprising that 
writers on the Cratylus have paid so little attention to it. The nature of 
voyos was a problem of the utmost concern for Plato, for the idea of voyos 
was inextricably bound up with the idea of fiucn, justice. If the voyoi of 
the state were and could be nothing more than arbitrarily or artificially 
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imposed conventions, then 6iKn, which characterized these voyoi and which 
was embodied in them, must also be arbitrary. Furthermore, as long as 6iKn 
was conceived of in terms of vo'yos and vo'yos remained diametrically opposed 
to $vo\s, then the very distinction between the just and the unjust could 
be nothing more than a matter of convention. No such distinction could be 
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admitted into the "order of nature." It should be clear by now that the 
question of voyos is a crucial one for Plato. Moreover, there is no reason 
to suppose that Plato was not aware of the question at the time he wrote 
the Cratylus. If, as is generally conceded, the Cratylus is later than the 
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Gorgias, then Plato could not have been ignorant of these difficulties 
since in that latter dialogue he explicitly raises them in the discussion 
between Socrates and Callicles. 
The problem which Plato had to face was this: how to preserve the 
relation of vo'yos to fiucn while at the same time vindicating them from the 
charge of arbitrary convention. His solution, baldly stated, was simply to 
reject the incompatibility of voyos and (jiuois. In short, Plato sought to 
reinstate voyos and 6iKn by showing that they could claim a rightful place 
in the order of <f>uois. It is not necessary here to give the details of how 
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Plato arrived at this solution. For our present purposes, all that is 
required is to show that this solution is fully operative in the Cratylus. 
First, there can be no doubt that in the Cratylus Plato identifies the 
"natural" with the "ideal." The nature (xriv <f>uoiv) of a shuttle is its 
ideal or Form (si<5os). And the name which is "fitted by nature" to each 
object (xo EKOOXO) <J>ub"Ei TTE<|>UKOS ovoya) is the "absolute or real" name (auxo 
EKE"IVO O EOXIV ovoya). Now the skill (xsxvn) of a craftsman (6nvn-°upY°s) 
consists in being able to embody in his materials the nature of the thing 
he makes. But this nature does not depend on the craftsman's will and 
therefore he cannot follow his own inclination in making his product but 
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must conform to the requirements of its nature. Thus a carpenter who 
decides to make a saw with no teeth will make a saw contrary to nature. 
Consequently, the skilled craftsman must know (ETu'oxaoOai) the nature of 
the thing he makes, i.e., he must have knowledge of its ideal or form. Now 
since the lawgiver is the "rarest of all artisans," he too must "fix his 
eye" (SXsVovxa) on this ideal. He must be able to embody in the state or 
ITOXIS the laws which are suited to it by nature. The obvious conclusion to 
be drawn from this is that vo'yos cannot be just arbitrary convention. For 
Plato, that which was truly a law was an embodiment of the ideal and intel-
ligible law which exists by nature and is indifferent to men's opinions. 
On the basis of the foregoing, we are now able to resolve the apparent 
inconsistency between Hermogenes's and Socrates's use of vo'yos. In appeal-
ing to voyos to express his conventionalist view, Hermogenes simply assumed 
the commonly held Sophistic notion that vo'yos or law is nothing more than 
arbitrary convention, while Socrates, in making vo'yos a weapon with which 
to attack conventionalism, rejects that notion and adopts, in effect, a 
theory of natural law. 
As was indicated earlier, these present remarks are intended as stage-
setting. The above account does not provide an answer to the most important 
question concerning Plato's understanding of vo'yos, namely how vo'yos "gives" 
us the names we use. However, it should be clear by now that in order to 
answer this question, it will be necessary to give an exact characteriza-
tion of the nature and function of the lawgiver. It is largely the presence 
of the lawgiver or "name-maker" (6nyioupyov ovoyaxtov) in the dialogue, 
coupled with such references as "the very ancient men who gave the names" 
(01 irdvu iraXaioi av0ptoiroi 01 xi0Eysvoi xa ovoyaxa, 411 B) and "the first 
giver of names" (6 S E R V O S irpSxos xa ovoyaxa, 436 B) which has caused some 
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commentators to suppose that the topic of the Cratylus is the origin of 
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language. Proponents of this view have, I believe, seriously misunderstood 
Plato's intentions. However, in seeking to avoid this mistake, certain 
other of Plato's commentators have been led to commit an even more crucial 
one. Thus Professor Robinson says: 
Any tendency to think that the Cratylus discusses the 
origin of names is likely to be confirmed by the observation 
that in this dialogue there are many references to "the very 
ancient men who made the names" (411 B), to "the first men in • 
Greece" (397 C), and to a certain "lawgiver" or "namemaker" 
(389 Al) or "onomast" (424 A), whose thoughts we are guessing 
when we try to explain the Tightness of a name (e.g., 408 Bl). 
It is easy to suppose that this lawgiver is intended to be an 
historical figure, and from that supposition it would follow 
that Plato is trying to write history here, trying to decide 
what happened when men began to talk. And this seems to be 
further confirmed by all the talk about the debasement of 
names in the course of time. In making out particular etymol-
ogies, "Socrates" frequently supposes that the name as now 
used is an alteration of the name as first laid down, the 
alteration being due to time or to a desire for decoration or 
for euphony (414 C). 
But this is a misreading of the figure of the lawgiver. 
He is convenient to Plato because the implausibility of the 
particular etymologies offered can be palliated by calling our 
actual names debasements of the work of an original lawgiver. 
He is convenient because he personifies the idea of the cor-
rectness of names, and he does that well because we all easily 
fall into the error of assuming that the correct form of any-
thing is its earliest form (418 E10). He is attractive 
because he satisfies our desire to find that our culture is 
due to our own conscious and intentional human thinking 
working reasonably. 
But he is there not as a piece of history but as a 
mythical device to make it easier to develop an abstract 
theory. He is introduced (388 El) in a perfectly unhistorical 
way, as part of an abstract deductive theory, in the present 
tense not the past tense, and linked with another mythical 
character, the dialectician (390 C). 
"Socrates" knows by abstract reasoning on what principle 
this lawgiver proceeds (389). He is someone who ought to 
exist if names are to be correct, rather than someone who has 
existed. In fact, a correct set of names is an ideal to be 
realized in the future (424 B-C); and whether our actual 
names are correct is to be decided after we have ascertained 
the ideal (425 Bl-2). 
This lawgiver is as much a myth to Plato as the Adam who 
gave names to creatures is a myth to modernist Christians. 
He is like the point-particle we imagine in order to work out 
Newton's laws of motion. He is like the constructor of the 
material world in the Timaeus, posited in order to explain 
better the nature of a world that never was constructed 
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because it has always existed. Whenever he is inconvenient, 
he retires or dissolves. Sometimes he dissolves into a crowd 
of shadowy lawgivers or namemakers, Greek or barbarian (390 A), 
such as "those around Orpheus" (400 C); sometimes into the 
human mind (vouo, 415 B); sometimes into God (397 C, 438 C). 
He does not answer the question how names arose, but shelves 
it; and the Cratylus has nothing to say on the origin of 
names.60 
Professor Kretzmann, who cites the above passage from Robinson, adopts 
a very similar view: 
. . . the lawgiver/name-maker is clearly not some individual 
human being, but rather Plato's personification of a recog-
nized stipulative linguistic authority--more nearly like the 
French Academy or the O.E.D. than like Solon or Pisistratus.61 
Implicit in Robinson's view (and in Kretzmann's inasmuch as he accepts 
that view) is the assumption that unless we treat the lawgiver as a per-
sonification of some kind, we are forced to take the position that he is an 
historical figure and that, as a consequence, the Cratylus deals with the 
origin of language. First of all, it is worth pointing out that Robinson's 
claim that the lawgiver is "introduced in a perfectly unhistorical way, as 
part of an abstract deductive theory, in the present tense not the past 
tense" is equally true of the carpenter, the weaver and the smith (388 C-D) 
who, although unhistorical, are clearly not personifications. Further, if 
we deny that the lawgiver is a personification, it in no way follows from 
the fact that Plato refers to "ancient men who gave names" and "the first 
giver of names" that the lawgiver who is referred to in the nature-theory 
argument is historical. Not even if we add that the lawgiver and the name-
maker are identical. The relation of the latter referent to the former 
ones is that of general to particular. The unhistorical notion of the law-
giver (or name-maker) in general which is obviously at work in the nature-
theory argument is perfectly compatible with the subsequent references to 
allegedly historical instances of particular lawgivers at work. It follows 
then that it is not necessary to treat the lawgiver as a personification in 
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order to deny that he is an historical figure. 
Finally, at the risk of anticipating later developments in the dialogue, 
I want to show that we can take Plato's remarks about ancient name-makers, 
etc. quite seriously without being committed to holding that the Cratylus 
is about the origin of language. All such remarks occur in connection with 
an argument which we shall not have occasion to examine closely until the 
following chapter. The argument, briefly stated, runs as follows: if, by 
etymological analysis, it can be shown that certain names are contractions 
of combinations of other names and these names contractions of still other 
names, then it must be the case that sooner or later we will arrive at 
names which are not themselves constructed out of other names. Otherwise, 
we would have to admit either that there is an infinite regress of names or 
that the explanation of names is circular. This entails that the correct-
ness of the constructed names depends upon the correctness of the uncon-
structed names and hence "the very ancient men," who gave the "first names" 
(xa irpSxa, 435 A) must ensure that these first names are well-given if any 
names are to be correct. If the earliest name-givers had proceeded on 
wrong assumptions or had "fixed their eye" on an inferior ideal, the result-
ing names would all be mistaken. Furthermore, since these ancient lawgivers 
are giving the first names, their knowledge of the correctness of those 
names cannot be gained from names themselves, but must be derived directly 
from the things named. The proper conclusion is that if the lawgiver is to 
give names correctly, he must know the thing before he can know its name. 
Whether or not this argument is serious need not concern us here. 
What does concern us is that even if the argument is serious, it has little 
or nothing to do with how language arises. The purpose of the argument is 
clearly the twofold one of first showing that establishing the correct 
names depends upon the knowledge of the namegiver and second, that this 
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knowledge must be first-hand knowledge of the things named. The fact that 
Plato chooses to make these points sub specie of etymology is incidental. 
The points would be no less valid had Plato pictured the lawgiver as pro-
posing the addition of new names to an already existing language. 
Up to now, all we have shown is that we are not required to treat the 
lawgiver as a personification in order to avoid the mistake of treating the 
Cratylus as a dialogue on the origin of language. I propose now to show 
that there are good reasons for not treating the lawgiver in this way. We 
have already seen that in the nature-theory argument Plato draws several 
inferences from the fact that the giver of names is the lawgiver, namely 
that he is a skilled artisan, that he fixes his eye on an ideal, that his 
task is to embody in sounds and syllables the ideal name naturally suited 
to each object, and so on. Furthermore, these inferences are required as 
premises in the argument m order for it to be valid. It will, I think, be 
readily admitted that if these inferences are expressed in the form of 
propositions, those propositions would be about the lawgiver and could not 
in any conceivable sense be about such things as dictionaries or "the idea 
of correctness" (whatever that might be). But if we attempt to get around 
this by saying that while the propositions are about the lawgiver, the law-
giver personifies these things, we fall into the following dilemma. Either 
these propositions are asserted only of the lawgiver and say nothing of the 
things he personifies, or else these propositions, in being about the law-
giver, express some truths about the things he personifies. We can immedi-
ately rule out the first alternative since it would render the propositions 
in question totally irrelevant. But this seems the only reason one could 
have for accepting the second alternative. If these propositions are taken 
to express some truths about the thing or things personified, then it seems 
appropriate to ask what truths. It is by no means obvious how propositions 
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such as "the lawgiver is a skilled craftsman who like other skilled crafts-
men patterns his product on an ideal model" could express, even metaphorical-
ly, some truth about either dictionaries or ideas. If Plato was, in fact, 
intending the lawgiver as a personification, he would need in some way to 
show his reader that such a personification was appropriate and not merely 
convenient. He would have to produce some sort of justification for person-
ifying the O.E.D. or the idea of correctness as the lawgiver, for it is by 
no means obvious how the lawgiver aptly personifies either of these things. 
(As a paradigm case of such aptness, one thinks at once of the relation 
between the sun and the Good drawn in the Republic.) Since Plato does not 
do this, it follows, on the assumption that he intended the lawgiver as a 
personification, that he has committed what I shall call _tĥ  fallacy of 
convenient personification; i.e., he has personified something without 
showing or giving any grounds for believing that the personification 
reflects in the relevant ways the thing personified, and then drawn infer-
ences from the properties of the personifier which do not hold for the 
properties of the thing personified. 
It is, I believe, largely on the basis of his view that the lawgiver 
is a personification that Professor Robinson goes on ro say in a later 
paper: 
I conclude with some confidence that, while Plato may 
have entertained the nature-theory favorably before he wrote 
the Cratylus, and even while writing it, he soon came to see 
that it had no practical use, and he finally came to the con-
vention-theory implied in his Letter VII and stated by 
Aristotle. His writing of the Cratylus may have been a sort 
of purgation of the nature-theory from his mind, whether or 
not he already expected it to be so when he made his 
"Socrates" talk of purging the inspiration of Euthyphro 
(396 E) . 6 3 
The chief aim of the succeeding chapters will be to show that once he 
has made the proper adjustments in the nature-theory argument, Plato could, 
and did, consider that argument both valid and sound. 
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CHAPTER III 
AGAINST THE ETYMOLOGISTS 
The argument has reached the point where all the participants agree, 
or appear to agree, that there is such a thing as the natural correctness 
of names. Socrates now proceeds to ask what is obviously the next question, 
namely what property or properties of names are constitutive of such cor-
rectness. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that a crucial but 
unstated assumption of the argument so far has been that names are nothing 
more than vocal sounds and that correctness of names = correctness of vocal 
sounds. In what follows, I shall attempt to show that the main task which 
Plato accomplishes in the long and tedious section of etymologizing which 
is now begun, is to reduce this assumption to absurdity. 
Socrates begins his search for an answer with an obviously unserious 
(but caustic) appeal to Homer. Indeed, Socrates admits that in appealing 
to Homer he is making a sort of SEUXEPOS TTXOGS, since Hermogenes cannot 
afford to pay the fees charged by the sophists who are "those who know" 
(E'lriaxayEVtov). Now "the great and wonderful information about the correct-
ness of names" (y£ya xi Kai 0auyaaiov Xsyeiv . . . TTEPI ovoyaxwv op0oxntos) 
which Homer has to offer turns out to be this; that the Gods call a certain 
river "Xanthus" while men call it "Scamander"; and that there is a certain 
4 
kind of bird which the Gods call "chalcis," and men, "cymmdis." Further-
more, Socrates argues, since Homer says that Hector's son was called by two 
names, Astyanax and Scamandrius, and since Astyanax was the name used by 
the Trojan men, Scamandrius must have been the name used by the women. Now 
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obviously the men are wiser than the women and obviously the wise give 
names more correctly than the unwise, therefore Homer must have thought 
Astyanax was the more correct name for Hector's son. Even if one denies 
the unmistakable archness with which Socrates reports the above "informa-
tion" and maintains that this appeal to Homeric wisdom is serious, there is 
still the insurmountable difficulty of explaining how such information is 
supposed to shed light on the problem of the correctness of names. 
Socrates, still with tongue in cheek, now proceeds to discover a new 
"clue" to Homer's theories about names. Not only are the two names "Hector" 
and "Astyanax" both Greek but they both mean (anyaiVEi) nearly the same 
thing, namely king. For a lord (c(va£) is one who holds (EKXIDP) and rules 
that over which he is lord. Again, if it is assumed that we are to under-
stand this argument as serious, then an explanation is in order as to how 
the argument provides a clue to anything at all, let alone the correctness 
of names. 
It should be clear by now that Plato, in the Cratylus, is as much con-
cerned with portraying the intellectual (and perhaps moral) differences 
between Socrates and his two respondents as he is with trying to resolve 
genuine philosophical questions. Unfortunately, since the techniques Plato 
employs in behalf of the former all depend for their effectiveness on under-
standing and/or appreciating Plato's sense of humor, the Cratylus presents 
formidable and frustrating difficulties to its would-be interpreter. 
Perhaps the most formidable difficulty and certainly the most dangerous, in 
the sense that it is the easiest to stumble over, is that of unconscious 
bias. Which of Plato's arguments are intended as serious pieces of philoso-
phizing and which are intended to point out humorously some intellectual 
flaw in one of the characters? As soon as an interpreter gets what he 
thinks is a "feel" for the dialogue, i.e., comes to the point in his 
66 
research where he "sees" what Plato is driving at with respect to his 
philosophical concerns, it becomes dangerously easy to dismiss embarrassing 
and recalcitrant passages as being a part of his humorous concerns. The 
presence of this danger is as frustrating as it is formidable because there 
does not seem to be much in the way of conscious effort one can do to avoid 
it except, perhaps, to point out that it exists. This does not mean, how-
ever, that any interpretation must inevitably turn out biased, but only 
that it is difficult to defend one's claim for an unbiased one. Despite 
these difficulties, it is still the task, or at least the goal, of an 
interpreter to provide an interpretation and support it against other 
possible but conflicting interpretations. This, in turn, requires some 
principle which will allow one interpretation to be nonarbitrarily prefer-
able to another. In the present circumstances there is little hope of 
successfully defending an interpretation as the one which most accurately 
represents what Plato actually thought. Therefore, I have appealed through-
out, as a kind of final arbiter, to what is often called the Principle of 
Charity, i.e., given that there is more than one interpretation which is 
plausible, that interpretation which is most charitable to the author is 
preferable. It goes without saying, of course, that final judgment on 
whether the interpretation I offer is the most charitable one is left to 
the reader. 
To return to the discussion, Socrates, by way of these playful, almost 
mocking references to Homer, now introduces a point which advances the 
philosophical argument. He observes, quite sensibly, that the natural off-
spring of parents of a certain kind ought to be called by the same name as 
its parents. Thus the natural offspring of a horse shall be called a horse; 
7 
of a lion, a lion, etc. Socrates is quick to add, however, that being the 
offspring of parents of a certain kind is not a sufficient condition for 
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being correctly called by the name of that kind. What more is required is 
that the nature of the parents should be reproduced in the offspring. It 
is this second condition which distinguishes "natural" from "unnatural" 
births. Thus Socrates's point is not intended to apply only to biological 
cases of natural reproduction. The biological examples illustrate (and in 
fact presuppose) the more general thesis that things with the same "nature" 
9 
ought to be called by the same name. 
The significance of this point may be obscured somewhat by the fact 
that Plato chooses to make it in conjunction with still another piece of 
Socratic tomfoolery. Plato presents this argument as though it supported 
Homer's "opinion" that Hector and Hector's son, Astyanax, have names which 
mean "nearly the same thing," i.e., as though proper names functioned 
exactly like common nouns. But a human who is a EKXWP does not naturally 
produce another EKXWP (or even an ava£); he naturally produces only another 
human. Furthermore, even if we allow the absurd assumption that it is the 
function of proper names to describe their bearers (Plato is trading here 
on a confusion caused by the fact that in Greek, as in most natural 
languages, proper names are formed from common nouns), why should "holder" 
or "lord" be any more correct a name for Hector and his son than "man" or 
"husband" or "Trojan." It is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that 
a man of philosophic genius such as Plato was not aware of such howlers and 
10 
consequently there is no choice but to consider them deliberate. 
Nevertheless, despite these absurdities and despite the tenuous 
synonymy of "Hector" and "Astyanax," the two names still serve to illustrate 
(albeit badly) Plato's philosophical thesis that things of the same kind or 
nature should be given the same name. Socrates now proceeds to make what 
to my mind is the single most crucial point in the entire Cratylus. It is 
this point, which is first stated in the following passage and then 
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reiterated more than thirty times throughout the remainder of the dialogue, 
on which the whole of the present interpretation rests: 
. . . and whether the same meaning (xo auxo* anyai'vei) is 
expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no differ-
ence; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not 
matter either, so long as the essence (n ouoia) of the thing 
named remains in force and is made plain (<SnXouys\>n) in the 
name. (My underlining.)H 
It is this making plain the "essence" of the thing which, for Plato, 
12 is the sole necessary and sufficient condition for a name's being correct. 
While it is not yet clear either what Plato thinks is involved in the notion 
of making plain the essence of the thing or how a name is supposed to 
satisfy this condition, the first half of the above quoted passage begins 
to give some idea of what Plato does not think is involved in the notion 
and how a name does not satisfy this condition. It is important to note 
here that Socrates is made to say not only that two different sets of 
syllables can express the same meaning, but that the difference in the two 
sets of syllables makes no_ difference (OU6EV irpayya) in determining the 
13 
meaning. This sounds somewhat similar to Plato's remark in the Seventh 
14 
Letter about "circles" and "straight lines." Nevertheless, the possi-
bility is left open (because Plato does not explicitly rule it out) that 
two different sets of syllables can express one and the same meaning pro-
vided that they are the right syllables. 
But at this point Plato breaks off the serious philosophical discus-
sion in order to remind his readers (in case they may have forgotten!) that 
Hermogenes is a noodle. To illustrate his newly proposed criterion for 
correctness, Socrates turns to the letters of the alphabet. In most cases 
the Greek letters have names which are composed by adding other letters to 
the letter in question. Take beta, for instance. As long as we include a 
beta in the name, it really makes no difference that we add eta, tau, and 
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alpha, since they do no harm and do not prevent the whole name from making 
clear the nature of the letter beta. Hermogenes is quick to agree that 
this demonstrates the excellence of the lawgiver's skill at giving names to 
15 
letters. If there is a serious point in this obviously intended joke, it 
can only be that the "meaning" of the name "beta" is in no way a function 
of its letters. 
Socrates now returns to the argument and elaborates upon his previous 
point: 
. . . variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names 
which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just 
as the physicians' drugs, when prepared with various colours 
and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, 
but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal 
value (6uvayiv), they seem the same, and he is not confused 
by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about names 
considers their value (6UA)ayiv) and is not confused if some 
letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the 
force (Suvayis) of the name is expressed in entirely different 
letters. So, for instance, in the names we were just discus-
sing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, 
except t, but nevertheless they have the same meaning. And 
what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common 
with them9 Yet it means the same thing; (SnAo? <SE 5'yojs xo 
aoxo), and there are many other names which mean simply 
"king." Others again mean "general," such as Agis (leader), 
Polemarchus (warlord), and Eupolemus (good warrior); and 
others indicate physicians, as Iatrocles (famous physician) 
and Acesimbrotus (healer of mortals); and we might perhaps 
find many others which differ in syllables and letters, but 
express the same meaning.1? 
The examples which Socrates uses to support his claim that the force 
of the name can be expressed in entirely different letters are so disparate 
and include enough of the alphabet to strongly suggest that the same mean-
ing might be expressed in any set of letters. But these examples only sug-
gest this, they do not logically imply it. The possibility is still left 
open that the name could be constituted by entirely different letters 
provided they were the right letters. But this possibility becomes more 
remote when we consider carefully Plato's instructive analogy between names 
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and medicines. Like the skilled and knowledgeable physician who knows and 
is concerned with only the 6uvayis of his medicines and therefore disregards 
inessential elements such as coloring agents or perfumes, so the man who is 
knowledgeable about names knows and is concerned only with the 6u'vayis of 
the name and likewise disregards what is inessential to that 6uvayis. Now 
it is clear that in this analogy Plato intends the analogue of the coloring 
agents and perfumes of medicines to be the letters and syllables of names. 
This implies that Plato meant for his reader to understand that as the 
coloring agents and perfumes were to the 6uvayis of the medicine, so were 
the letters and syllables to the Suvayis of the name, i.e., inessential. 
Thus the analogy seems to commit Plato to the view that the Suvayis of the 
name (which is either to express the ouoia of the thing named or that ouoi'a 
itself; which is, in other words, that which determines its correctness) is 
not at all a matter of whatever letters and syllables happen to constitute 
the vocable aspect of the name. 
Some further light is shed on this analogy by Plato's earlier analogy 
between the lawgiver/namemaker and the skilled craftsman. Just as the 
skill of the shuttlemaker consists in embodying the form of a shuttle in 
the proper matter, namely, iron, so the skill of the namemaker consists in 
18 
embodying the form of a name in its proper matter, sounds and syllables. 
And just as the shuttlemaker can accomplish the same end, i.e., make the 
same instrument for the same purpose (xou aikou EVEKO) by embodying the 
form in different iron, so the namemaker can do likewise with different 
syllables. The criterion for sameness is identical in both cases, that the 
same form (xnv auxnv ISEOV) be embodied in the matter. From this, 
Socrates is made to conclude: 
On this basis, then, you will judge the lawgiver, whether 
he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each 
thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables 
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(EV oTroiaiooOv ouXAaBaTs, my underlining) to be no worse 
lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?20 
First, it should be noted that the possibility which was left open in 
the later analogy between medicines and names, i.e., that difference in the 
syllables was permissible provided they were the right syllables, is in the 
present analogy explicitly denied. Here any syllables whatever will do 
provided that the criterion for correctness is met, provided, in other 
words, that the name expresses or makes clear the nature of the thing 
named. 
Moreover, m the present analogy, sounds and syllables are conceived 
of as simply the matter on which the namemaker imposes some form. It is 
the proper imposition of the form which insures the correctness of the 
name. But if correctness of name is nothing more than correctness of vocal 
sound, what is it that the namemaker imposes? Surely it cannot be the 
sounds and syllables themselves, for it is explicitly stated that they are 
only the matter in which the form is embodied. If it is the vocal sound 
which is determinative of correctness, the only other "form" the namemaker 
could possibly embody in letters and syllables would be a certain arrange-
ment. It is, perhaps, a piece of deliberate irony that one obvious fact 
that the mimetic theory, which Socrates is soon to propose, cannot account 
for is that words such as yn<$os and 6nyos, which contain exactly the same 
imitative letters, but differ only in arrangement, can both make clear the 
22 
nature of two entirely dissimilar things. 
One further implication of Socrates's above-quoted remarks is that his 
theory that names are naturally correct does not claim that there is one 
and only one naturally correct name which is the same for every natural 
language. What the above passage suggests is that two natural languages 
can, with respect to the same nominates, employ entirely different sets of 
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vocal sounds to name those nominates and still have those vocal sounds be 
entirely correct. What is commonly binding on both languages is the 
principle by which correct names are determined. For both (and all) languages 
a name will be correct if and only if it makes clear the nature or essence 
23 
of the thing named. 
If there are still any lingering doubts as to Plato's view concerning 
the relationship between the correctness of a name and its letters and 
syllables, the following passage should serve to dispel them. 
SOC. Then I must now ask you to consider with me the subject 
which Hermogenes and I discussed a while ago. Do you 
think I am right in saying that rho is expressive of 
speed, motion, and hardness, or not9 
CRA. You are right. 
SOC. And lambda is like smoothness, softness, and the other 
qualities we mentioned? 
CRA. Yes. 
SOC. You know, of course, that we call the same thing OKAnpoxns 
(hardness) which the Eretrians call OKAnpoxnp? 
CRA. Certainly. 
SOC. Have rho and Sigma both a likeness to the same thing, 
and does the final rho mean to them just what the sigma 
means to us, or is there to one of us no meaning? 
CRA. They mean the same to both. 
SOC. In so far as rho and sigma are alike, or in so far as they 
are not? 
CRA. In so far as they are alike. 
SOC. And are they alike in all respects? 
CRA. Yes; at least for the purpose of expressing motion 
equally. 
SOC. But how about the lambda in OKAnpoxns? Does it not 
express the opposite of hardness? 
CRA. Well, perhaps it has no right to be there, Socrates; it 
may be like the cases that came up in your talk with 
Hermogenes, when you removed or inserted letters where 
i\ 
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that was necessary. I think you did right; and in this 
case perhaps we ought to put a rho in place of the lambda. 
SOC, Excellent. However, do we not understand one another 
when anyone says OKAnpov, using the present pronuncia-
tion, and do you not now know what I mean9 
CRA. Yes, but that is by custom, my friend. 
SOC. In saying "custom" do you think you are saying anything 
different from convention? Do you not mean by "conven-
tion" that when I speak I have a definite meaning and 
you recognize that I have that meaning? Is not that 
what you mean? 
CRA. Yes. 
SOC. Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is 
an indication given to you by me. 
CRA. Yes. 
SOC. The indication comes from something which is unlike my 
meaning when I speak, if in your example OKAnpo'xns the 
lambda is unlike hardness; and if this is true, did you 
not make a convention with yourself, since both like 
and unlike letters, by the influence of custom and con-
vention, produce indication? And even if custom is 
entirely distinct from convention, we should henceforth 
be obliged to say that custom, not likeness, is the 
principle of indication (SnAwya) since custom, it 
appears, indicates both by the like and by the unlike. 
And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that 
your silence gives consent—both convention and custom 
must contribute something towards the indication of our 
meaning when we speak. For, my friend, if you will 
just turn your attention to numbers, where do you think 
you can possibly get names to apply to each individual 
number on the principle of likeness, unless you allow 
agreement and convention on your part to control the 
correctness of names?24 
It will be recalled that the one alternative which Plato appeared to 
have left open in the earlier passages in which he discussed the relation-
ship between the correctness of a name and its letters and syllables was 
that two different sets of letters could make clear the nature of one and 
the same nominate provided that they were the correct letters. But in the 
above passage, Plato explicitly and dramatically denies this. Not only is 
lambda not (by the mimetic theory) the correct letter for indicating 
hardness, it actually indicates the exact opposite of hardness. Neverthe-
less, PKAnpoxns succeeds in making clear the nature of its nominate, for 
Cratylus admits that when Socrates said "oKXnpo'xns," Cratylus understood 
perfectly well that that vocal sound conventionally signified hardness. 
We may conclude, therefore, that it is Plato's considered judgment 
throughout the whole of the Cratylus that letters and syllables are in no 
way constitutive of the natural correctness of names, which is the quality 
a name has in virtue of which it makes clear the nature or essence of the 
thing it names. This is not to say, however, that Plato was ignorant of 
the fact that there was a perfectly legitimate sense in which names were 
conventionally correct. As the above passage makes clear, a name qua vocal 
sound may be correct in the sense that a certain group of speakers (usually 
of the same language) have (tacitly) adopted the convention of agreeing to 
use that vocal sound as a name for something. As long as the agreement is 
in force, that set of syllables, which comprises the vocal sound, is the 
correct set of syllables by which a speaker governed by the agreement may 
"indicate" that something. In like manner, a set of syllables which has 
not been so agreed upon, or which has been agreed upon as the vocal sound 
to indicate a different something, would be incorrect if used by a speaker 
governed by the agreement to indicate the previous something. It is pre-
cisely this conventional correctness which Plato is pointing out with his 
OKXnpoxns example. However, as we have already shown, he is, by the same 
example, also pointing out that while once the agreements are in force, it 
does make a difference which vocal sounds are used as names, it makes abso^ 
lutely no difference which vocal sounds happen to be agreed upon. In short, 
what Plato has shown is the following: whether or not a vocal sound func-
tioning in some language as a name is conventionally correct is determined 
by whether or not certain agreements are in force. But whether or not that 
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name is naturally correct, i.e., whether or not that name makes clear the 
nature of the thing named, can never be determined by finding out what 
agreements are in force. To show the absurd consequences that follow from 
failing to distinguish properly these two criteria for correctness is 
Plato's primary concern in the development of both the etymologies and the 
mimetic theory. 
The long etymological section in the Cratylus has been the basis for 
still another of the controversies which, like barnacles, seem to attach 
themselves to the dialogue. It is not surprising to find that the question 
which has most often been in the forefront of this controversy is whether 
or not Plato took the etymologies seriously. What is surprising is that so 
many of Plato's commentators have assumed that the correct answer to this 
25 
question depends solely on whether the etymologies are accurate or not. 
For those who have come out in favor of seriousness, the conjectures as to 
what serious philosophical purpose the etymologies serve have, for the most 
part, ranged from the trite to the outlandish. Thus we are told by one 
writer that the purpose of the etymological section is to present a melange 
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of ideas from earlier thinkers, chief among which are the Heracliteans, 
while another informs us that the etymologies represent a pioneering effort 
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in the phenomenological analysis of speech. Still others suggest such 
things as that the etymologies "make it clear that words strive for 
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things," or that they are given with the "serious and sincere purpose of 
?9 
establishing the conclusion (that names are naturally correct)."" 
Those who have favored an unserious interpretation have, at least, the 
advantage of strong textual support for their claim. Heath has pointed out 
that Plato, 
A master of his own language—and that the living Greek, 
lending itself to the formation of derivatives and compounds 
to an unparalleled extent, as he must himself have constantly 
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experienced (he somewhere apologizes for iroioxns)—he surely 
must have felt that terminations like nais-ta-aios must stand 
disconnected from the stems to which they are affixed, and 
must have everywhere the same force:—that Kivnffis cannot be 
resolved into KIV-IEOIS while <j>p6\>no"is--= d>po-ovnois, or 6EXi'a 
into SEI-XIOV while KOKIO = KaK-i'a § c.30 
Other instances of this type are not difficult to find. For example, Plato 
31 could not have been unaware that at 414 D, he completely contradicts what 
he asserted in the OKXUPOXES passage at 434 C. Again, after he has laid 
down the principle that the correctness of a name consists in showing the 
nature of the thing named, it is ridiculous to suppose that Plato seriously 
believed that the nature of Poseidon was to be a "foot-bond" (Tro0i'-6E<Tyov) 
or that the nature of an c/voya was to be a "being about which our search 
is" (421 A). Thus if Plato did have some serious purpose in mind in the 
etymological section, he obviously combined it with several unserious ones. 
If by "serious purpose" it is meant that Plato was in some way express-
ing sympathy for the fruitfulness of etymologizing, then, I think, it is 
quite clear that, m this sense, Plato was not serious. If, however, by 
"serious purpose" it is meant that Plato intended for the reader to draw 
some conclusion from the etymologies which was relevant to the philosophical 
argument of the Cratylus, then, in this sense, Plato was quite serious. 
Plato's etymologies are, without exception, derived in accordance with 
the following principle: if x is an etymological antecedent of y, then x 
must sound like either y or some part of y. This fact alone is sufficient 
to warrant the conclusion that, for Plato, an etymological derivation is a 
derivation of some vocal sound. But since the only sense of correctness 
applicable to vocal sounds is conventional-correctness, etymology is use-
less in determining whether or not a name makes clear the nature of the 
thing it names. This point is easily lost sight of, however, because the 
form of the argument is not made explicit due to the fact that Plato has 
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designed the argument to do two different things: (a) support the above 
conclusion, and (b) reveal to the reader the ineptitude of both of Socrates's 
respondents. Thus (by invoking the Principle of Charity) the most plausible 
interpretation of the argument is as a sort of long reductio ad absurdum. 
Plato begins with an obviously false assumption and then proceeds to show 
'it to be false by drawing from it an absurd conclusion. He then accomplishes 
his second objective by the simple expedient of having both Hermogenes and 
Cratylus assent to the absurdity. 
If we add the content to the form, the argument would proceed as 
follows. Assume that in order for a name to express the nature of the 
thing it names, it must contain the correct letters and syllables. Now it 
is in fact the case that most of the names (vocal sounds) in any natural 
language are compound names constructed out of simpler names which are, in 
turn, constructed out of even simpler names, etc. But if we are to avoid 
the logical absurdity of an infinite regress of simpler and yet simpler 
names, there must be some names out of which other names are compounded but 
32 
which are not themselves compound names. It is easily seen that the cor-
rectness of the compound (later) names depends upon the correctness of the 
33 
simple (earlier) names. Therefore no names will be correct unless the 
34 simple ones are. But if the method of determining the correctness of 
compound names is by analyzing them into their simpler parts, a new method 
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of determining correctness must be found for the simple names. Yet it 
appears that the only way that the simple names can correctly show the 
nature or essence of the things they name is for the letters and syllables 
of those names to imitate those essences. Therefore names show the 
nature of the things they name by being vocal imitations of those natures! 
What Plato has shown by this argument is that the assumption that 
names can show the nature of the things they name only if they are composed 
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of the correct letters and syllables has led to the absurd conclusion 
that names are correct only if they are vocal imitations of these natures. 
Hermogenes and Cratylus are presented with two alternatives: either they 
can reject the assumption which led to the conclusion or they can accept 
the assumption and be forced to admit the conclusion. Thus Plato has 
skillfully killed two birds with a single stone. He has presented an over-
whelmingly convincing argument for denying the truth of the assumption and 
he has once again demonstrated, with considerable subtlety, the vast intel-
lectual gap which exists between Socrates and his two companions. 
One reason why Hermogenes and Cratylus both fail to reject the assump-
tion is their failure to distinguish the sense of "being correct" in which 
a name is conventionally correct from the sense m which a name is naturally 
correct. Once this distinction is made, it follows that making clear the 
nature cannot be a matter of letters and syllables, since the latter is 
always a matter of agreement while the former never is. Hermogenes and 
Cratylus, however, are blind to this fact and are convinced, therefore, 
that in showing them how vocal sounds used as names were originally attempts 
to imitate the things they named, Socrates was also showing them the one 
true way in which a name can make clear the nature of the thing it names. 
But this is patently absurd. Even if Socrates's mimetic theory were 
true, i.e., even if the "ancient namemakers" did, in fact, select rho to 
imitate motion and lambda to imitate smoothness, etc., this would only be 
an accurate account of how the earliest or the simplest names were in fact 
produced. Must they have been produced that way? Would a language in 
which the earliest or simplest names had their letters and syllables 
assigned on some other criterion, or even on no criterion at all (except, 
perhaps, pronounceability) be any less capable of making clear the nature 
of the things they named? Well, we are forced to give a "ridiculous and 
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outrageous" affirmative answer to these questions only if we assume that 
what it is for a name to show the nature of the thing it names is nothing 
other than its being composed of certain letters and syllables. 
Thus the historical accuracy of Socrates's account of how imitation 
came to be a principle governing the correctness of names is quite beside 
the point. The accuracy of the account does not entail the truth of the 
theory. 
But what if the theory is_ true? Wouldn't the foregoing interpretation 
be vitiated if, as some commentators have claimed, there is a "good deal of 
38 
sense" in the mimetic theory? To answer this question, it would be well 
to remind ourselves that the mimetic theory as it is developed by Socrates 
in the Cratylus is not a theory which can apply to some languages and not 
to others. As stated by Socrates, the theory entails that for any language, 
if its names are to succeed in making clear the nature of the things they 
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name, the letters and syllables of those names must imitate those things. 
I am perfectly willing to concede that if any commentators can find a good 
deal of sense in that theory, or, at least, show that Plato could have 
found a good deal of sense in such a theory, then the foregoing interpreta-
tion is vitiated. However, as to the likelihood of any commentator ever 
doing either of these things, I can do no better than to quote the words of 
Mr. J. L. Ackrill. 
[Demos] says that "Socrates . . . asserts that there is 
a natural or inherent appropriateness about names" (595), but 
that "Plato more or less abandons this doctrine as he goes on, 
because he does not see how words could imitate numbers" (596). 
Now Socrates does not assert that doctrine (391a4-6), but he 
and Hermogenes think it follows from the shuttle argument of 
386e-390e. This is a philosophical argument purporting to 
show that there must be natural limitations upon word making 
as there are upon, for example, axe making, Later argument 
(434e-435c) shows that this conclusion is false (at least if 
the natural limitation in question is taken to be the likeness 
of word to thing). As a nonphilosophical theory about 
languages the mimetic theory can survive as partly right—it 
can be "more or less abandoned." But as a philosophical 
thesis about the necessary conditions of language it is 
exploded. For the argument for it was a perfectly general 
one; and if the conclusion drawn from that argument is shown 
to be incorrect the argument loses all its force. I do not 
of course wish to deny that there is interest in considering 
how far the mimetic account is right with respect to this or 
that language. I wish only to separate this question from 
the different and strictly philosophical question about the 
necessary conditions of language in general, and to stress 
that Plato proves that custom or agreement can suffice to 
guarantee understanding in communication without the neces-
sity of a natural tie between word and thing. Demos writes 
as though Plato would have been able to preserve his mimetic 
doctrine if only he had been able to see how words could 
imitate numbers. But the philosophical thesis that words, 
to be meaningful and understood, must be likenesses of things 
is decisively refuted once it is seen that they need not be.40 
Perhaps now the full force of Socrates's OKXnpoxns example is clear. 
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9Cf. Rep_ 596 A. 
Socrates even warns Hermogenes that the argument is fallacious. 
After Hermogenes assents to the point that naturally produced offspring 
should be called by the same (common) noun as their parents, Socrates says, 
"Good, but keep watch of me and do not let me trick you; for by the same 
argument any offspring of a king should be called a king" (393 C) which is 
patently false. But Hermogenes fails to take the warning for he soon 
assents to Socrates's statement that "a king's son will probably be a 
king" (394 A). 
11Crat., 393 D. 
12 
Cf. Crat., 396 A and esp. 422 C-D and 428 E. In other expressions 
of this principle of correctness, Plato substitutes for ouoi'a certain words 
which he appears to be using, or intending to use, as synonyms for ouoia; 
e.g., <t>uais, 393 E, 395 B-396 A fiuvayis, 394 B, 405 A, 405 E, aXn'0sia, 
438 D-E. 
13 
For alternative English translations of EI Se e\> ETE'POIS ouXXaBals 
h £v EXEpais x6 av3x6 onyai'vEi OU6EV Trpayya, cf. Jowett: "And whether the 
syllables of the name are the same or not the same makes no difference, 
provided the meaning is retained"; and Burges: "Now it matters not whether 
the signification be the same in syllables different in one way or another" 
(Bonn's Classical Library, Bell and Sons, London, 1881, Vol. Ill, p. 301). 
Cf. p. 28 above. 
Crat., 393 D-E. 
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Professor Crombie has pointed out in an extremely interesting dis-
cussion the metaphorical use of letters and syllables as ontological build-
ing blocks in Plato's later dialogues. He goes on to contrast two different 
"dialectical" techniques, that of collecting and dividing on the one hand, 
and what he calls "spelling" on the other. The Philebus is an example of 
the former, while the Statesman is an example of the latter. (An Examina-
tion of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. II, pp. 374-86.) If Crombie is correct, 
and his arguments are persuasive, then there is some plausibility in 
supposing that the passage in the Cratylus concerning the names of the 
letters not only has reference to, but sheds some light on, the well-known 
"Socrates's Dream" passage in the Theaetetus (201 E ff). If the basic 
element constitutive of names (i.e., letters) can themselves be named, 
doesn't this hold out at least the possibility that the basic elements 
constitutive of rational explanation can, by the analogy, themselves be 
rationally explained? This suggestion is, of course, highly conjectural 
and implies the highly unlikely possibility that the Cratylus is later 
than the Theaetetus. 









Burges translates the underlined phrase ". . .in any 
kind of syllable whatever" (Bohn's, p. 295). 
21 
This is not to say that he did not leave this possibility open 
deliberately. In fact, the possibility that two sets of syllables must 
both be correct, though different, is presupposed both by the etymologies 
and the mimetic theory which follow. 
22 
In a highly relevant passage in the Sophist (253 A), Theaetetus 
points out that the man who is skilled in joining letters together is 
called a grammarian (not a name maker)! The stranger then distinguishes 
this skill from the "knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how 
individual things can or cannot be associated with one another" (253 E), 
which is the skill possessed by the dialectician who is the "greatest of 
scientists." 
23 
Cf. p. 49 above. This suggestion is borne out at 409 E where 
Socrates admits that names are given reasonably or suitably (EIKOXUS) in 
languages other than Greek and should not therefore be judged from the 
point of view of Greek phonetics. 
24Crat., 434 C-435 C. 
25E.g., Grote, Plato, Vol. II, p. 526; Taylor, Plato The Man and His 
Work, p. 82; Shorey, What Plato Said, p. 255; Lutoslawski, Plato's Logic, 
p. 228; Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 13; L. Meridier, Le Cratyle (Bude, 
Pns, 1929), pp. XVI-XX, 
V. Goldschmidt, Essai sur le "Cratyle" (Paris, 1940), pp. 90-96. 
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27 
J. Derbolav, Der Dialog "Kratylos" (Rahmen der Platonischen Sprach-
und Erkentnis-philosophie, Saarbrucken, 1953), pp. 30-32. 
28 
Friedlander, p. 197. 
29 
Grote, p. 523. 
30 
D. D. Heath, "On Plato's Cratylus" (Journal of Philology, 1888), 
pp. 200-01. 
31 
"SOC. My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words 
have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them 
up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and 
have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the 
lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter 
rho is inserted in the word Kaxoirxpov (mirror)9 I think that sort of thing 
is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of 
their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no 
human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the 
sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many 
other examples" (414 C-D). 
32 
"But let us bear in mind that if a person asks about the words by 
means of which names are formed, and again about those by means of which 
those words were formed, and again about those by means of which those 
words were formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his 
questions will at last give up} will he not9' 
HER. Yes, I think so. 
SOC. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? 
Will it not be when he reaches the names which are the elements of the 
other names and words9 For these, if they are the elements, can no longer 
rightly appear to be composed of other names. For instance, we said just 
now that aya0ov was composed of dyaoxdv and 0oov; and perhaps we might say 
that Ooo'v was composed of other words, and those of still others; but if we 
ever get hold of a word which is no longer composed of other words, we 
should be right in saying that we had at last reached an element, and that 
we must no longer refer to other words for its derivation" (421 E-422 B). 
33 
"And yet if anyone is, no matter why, ignorant of the correctness of 
the earliest names, he cannot know about that of the later, since they can 
be explained only by means of the earliest, about which he is ignorant. 
No, it is clear that anyone who claims to have scientific knowledge of 
names must be able first of all to explain the earliest names perfectly, or 
he can be sure that what he says about the later will be nonsense" (426 A-B) 
34 
Thus Plato recognizes a point made earlier (cf. above, pp. 9-10). 
From the fact that some names are nonarbitrarily correct, it does not 
follow that any names are nonartificially correct. E.g., "bird dog" may be 
nonarbitrary even though "bird" and "dog" are artificial. 
35Crat., 422 D-E. 
It will, I imagine, seem ridiculous that things are made manifest 
through imitation in letters and syllables; nevertheless it cannot be 
otherwise. For there is no better theory upon which we can base the truth 
of the earliest names (425 D). Also 424 B: "Since the imitation of the 
essential nature (xfis ouoias) is made with letters and syllables . . . ." 
37Crat., 425 D and 426 B. 
38 
E.g., by Allen, "Ancient Ideas On The Origin And Development of 
Language," p. 41 ff. and K. Lorenz and J. Mittelstrass, "On Rational 
Philosophy of Language: The Programme In Plato's Cratylus Reconsidered" 
(Mind, Jan. 1967), pp. 10-11. 
•59 
Crat . , 425 D. 
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A view which is commonly found m the literature on the Cratylus is that 
the nature theory which Socrates advances against Hermogenes at the begin-
ning of the dialogue (385 E-394 C) is thoroughly and convincingly repudiated 
in the discussion between Socrates and Cratylus toward the end of the 
dialogue. I believe that there are quite plausible grounds on which to 
reject this view. What is thoroughly and convincingly repudiated in the 
argument with Cratylus is not the nature theory, but the mimetic theory. 
Immediately, this statement raises the following objection: the analysis 
given in the preceding chapter purported to show that the mimetic theory is 
a consequence of the nature theory. Therefore, any argument which repudi-
ates the mimetic theory would, by modus tollens, also repudiate the nature 
theory. This objection is a sound one only if it is assumed that Plato 
seriously intended the nature theory to be a theory about the correctness 
of vocal sounds. If this assumption is denied, the mimetic theory is not a 
consequence of the nature theory and the objection collapses. I propose to 
show that the following three propositions are all true: (1) in rejecting 
the mimetic theory, Plato is rejecting an absurd misinterpretation of the 
nature theory; (2) Plato does accept a form of the nature theory in the 
Cratylus; and (3) Plato believed, in the Cratylus, that what made a name 
make clear the essence of the thing it named was not a matter of its 
letters and syllables, but of its definition. 
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Ammonius, in his commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione, 
attributes the following view to Cratylus: 
For each object there is an appropriate name set aside by 
nature, just as we find a particular impression belonging to 
each object of perception: for names are like natural and 
not artificial (06 xats xsxvnxais) images of perceptible 
objects—like shadows and reflections in water or in 
mirrors.2 
Ammonius does not cite any source for this remark, but it is extremely 
unlikely that his text could have been the Cratylus. Not only does Cratylus 
not say anything in the dialogue which even remotely resembles the above 
passage, but he actually is made to accept a view which is inconsistent 
with that passage. On Socrates's mimetic theory, names imitate the 
essential nature of a thing and not its perceptible qualities (423 D-E). 
Furthermore, in Plato's dialogue, Cratylus's "silence gives consent" to 
abandoning the mimetic theory (435 B). But if Ammonius was not thinking of 
the Cratylus when he wrote the above passage, it is reasonable to suppose 
that there existed some other source on which he based the attribution of 
the views contained therein to Cratylus. This in turn suggests the pos-
sibility that Cratylus himself was either the originator or a major 
promulgator of the view that names are imitations. 
If this were in fact the case, it would serve to strengthen the present 
account of Plato's motives for proposing the mimetic theory by adding to it 
a devastatingly ironical twist. Not only is the mimetic theory the absurd 
consequence by which Plato exposes the obvious error in the view that cor-
rectness of name is equivalent to correctness of vocal sound, but the 
mimetic theory which Iterates now presents to Cratylus for his approval is 
actually Cratylus's own theory! 
Many scholars have argued for the plausibility of ascribing the mimetic 
theory to a supposedly convinced Heraclitean such as Cratylus on the grounds 
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of consistency. However, no one has, to my knowledge, yet noted what 
seems to me to be the strongest piece of evidence for attributing some form 
of the mimetic theory to Cratylus. At 430 B, Socrates asks Cratylus if he 
agrees that a name is an imitation of the thing named (OUKOOV KO"I XO ^voya 
oyoXoye'is yiynya' xi eivai xou irpayyaxos) to which Cratylus replies, •rra'vxujv 
ya'Xioxa. As far as I am able to determine, this most emphatic of all Greek 
4 
affirmative responses does not occur again anywhere m the dialogue. It 
thus becomes legitimate to ask why Plato should suddenly and dramatically 
depart from his standard stock of affirmative responses, which he employs 
with rigid regularity throughout the rest of the dialogue, to insert Travxojv 
ydXioxa at this one place. It is by no means far-fetched to suggest that 
the answer to this question may be that Socrates has "borrowed" the mimetic 
theory and now Plato is allowing him to return it to its rightful owner. 
But if Cratylus did, in fact, not only hold but originate the mimetic 
theory, he did so only by assuming that the natural correctness of a name 
is determined by its letters and syllables. However, in the nature theory 
that Socrates is made to develop at the beginning of the dialogue, this 
assumption need not be made. On the basis of that theory, Socrates is 
made to conclude only that the natural correctness of a name is determined 
by whether or not the name makes clear the essence of the thing named and 
this by itself does not entail anything whatever about the propriety or 
impropriety of letters and syllables. This difference between the two 
theories is crucial. On Socrates's earlier theory, he is free to point out 
the obvious truth that two or more names are equally capable of making clear 
the nature of one and the same nominate regardless of their letters and 
7 
syllables. But on the later (or longer) theory, Cratylus is forced to 
concede that one name is "more correct" than another, i.e., it makes 
clearer the nature of the thing it names if it contains more proper letters 
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than the other. I believe therefore that it is possible to separate two 
distinct nature theory arguments at work in the Cratylus: (1) the argument 
from 385 E to 394 C, the proper conclusion of which is that a name is 
naturally correct if and only if it makes clear the nature of the thing it 
names, and (2) the argument from 385 E to 427 D, the proper conclusion of 
which is that a name is naturally correct if and only if its letters and 
syllables imitate the nature of the thing named. Now these two arguments 
are not formally inconsistent but, as has just been shown, they proceed 
from different unstated assumptions which are formally inconsistent. In 
drawing the proper conclusion from (1), Socrates is made to point out that 
letters and syllables have no bearing whatsoever on that conclusion. But 
if this is so, the argument from which this conclusion was reached cannot 
have assumed that correctness of name is equivalent to correctness of vocal 
sound. However, in (2), it is easily seen that the argument must assume 
that correctness of name is equivalent to correctness of vocal sound, for 
it is only on this assumption that the argument can be valid. 
Once the difference between the two arguments and their underlying 
assumptions is accepted, it becomes clear that the discussion between 
Socrates and Cratylus at the end of the dialogue cannot be used to justify 
g 
the claim that Plato repudiates the nature theory in the Cratylus. Every-
thing that Socrates says in that discussion is directed against (2), and 
while Socrates does produce "unchallengeable arguments" against (2) in his 
dispute with Cratylus, nowhere in the dialogue does he either present any 
argument against, or express even the slightest doubt concerning, the 
validity of (1). It is the mimetic theory which gets refuted in the 
exchange between Socrates and Cratylus, not the theory that a name is 
correct if and only if it makes clear the nature of the thing it names. 
This in itself is sufficient to warrant the hypothesis that there are two 
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distinct nature-theories presented in the Cratylus. The clincher, however, 
lies (once again) in Socrates's OKXnpoxns example. In that example, the 
criterion which falsifies the mimetic theory and which restores convention 
as a principle governing the correctness of names is that OKXnpdrns succeeds 
in making clear the nature of the thing it names. In other words, by show-
ing that OKXnpdrns satisfies (1) but does not satisfy (2), Socrates believed 
he had conclusively demonstrated that (2) is false. 
This is about all the evidence that can be offered in behalf of the 
foregoing interpretation. But this seems to leave us with the conclusion 
that Plato's views about the correctness of names, in the Cratylus at least, 
are almost wholly negative; i.e., Plato seems more intent on telling us 
what the correctness of names is not than on telling us what it is. Yet 
while it may be true that Plato never explicitly states in the Cratylus how 
he thinks a name makes clear the nature of the thing it names, there is 
much to be said for the claim that to the careful reader he has left no 
room for doubt. Consider the following passage. 
SOC. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the 
likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to 
the woman, and so forth? 
CRA. Certainly. 
SOC. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the 
woman, and the woman's to the man? 
CRA. That is also possible. 
SOC. And are these assignments both correct, or only the 
former9 
CRA. The former. 
SOC. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that 
which belongs to it and is like it. 
CRA. That is my view. 
SOC. To put an end to contentious argument betweenyyou and 
me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I 
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call that kind of assignment in the case of both imita-
tions- -paintings and names—correct, and in the case of 
names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, 
which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call 
incorrect and, in the case of names, false (430 C-D). 
I wish to suggest the following as an accurate account of what takes 
place in this passage. Socrates, in order to avoid prolonging the "con-
tentious argument" between Cratylus and himself, attempts to make clear the 
nature of what he is calling a "correct assignment." 
Now consider another passage: 
SOC. My excellent Cratylus, I myself have been marvelling at 
my own wisdom all along, and I cannot believe in it. 
So I think we ought to reexamine my utterances. For 
the worst of all deceptions is self-deception. How can 
it help being terrible, when the deceiver is always 
present and never stirs from the spot? So I think we 
must turn back repeatedly to what we have said and must 
try, as the poet says, to look "both forwards and back-
wards." Then let us now see what we have said. Cor-
rectness of a name, we say, is the quality of showing 
the nature of the thing named (428 D-E). 
Again I suggest the following as an accurate account of what occurs in 
the passage. In reviewing the previous discussion in order to ascertain 
whether or not they have made any errors, Socrates attempts to make clear 
the nature of what he and his respondents have agreed to call "correctness 
of a name." 
And finally one further passage: 
SOC. Then if I were to ask "What instrument is the shuttle?" 
Is it not that with which we weave? 
HER. Yes. 
SOC. And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate 
the mingled threads of warp and woof? 
HER. Yes. 
SOC. And you could give a similar answer about the borer and 
the rest, could you not? 
HER. Certainly. 
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SOC. And can you say something of the same kind about a 
name? The name being an instrument, what do we do 
with it when we name? 
HER. I cannot tell. 
SOC. Do we not teach one another something, and separate 
things according to their natures? 
HER. Certainly. 
SOC, A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of 
separating reality, as a shuttle is an instrument 
of separating the web? (388 A-C, my underlining). 
Accurate Account: In order to advance the argument that names have a 
natural correctness, Socrates attempts to establish that a name is an 
instrument and like other instruments performs a certain function. To 
illustrate his point, Socrates attempts to make clear the nature of the 
things that we call by such names as "shuttle," "weaving," and "name." 
Now if I am correct in thinking that I have accurately described the 
above passages, then they all have two things in common: first, in all of 
them, Socrates attempts to make clear the nature of something which has 
been referred to by means of a certain vocal sound. Second, in all of 
these passages, Socrates attempts to make the nature clear in the exact 
same way--by defining the vocal sound! 
To anyone familiar with the literature on the Cratylus, this will 
appear to be an extremely radical view, since, to my knowledge, no one has 
yet suggested anything remotely resembling the claim that what Plato was 
implicitly saying in the Cratylus was that a name was naturally correct 
(made clear the nature of the thing it named) if and only if it was defined 
correctly. But if we consider the matter closely, the above examples only 
serve to strengthen what is already obvious. If the function or "work" of 
a name is to instruct and to separate things according to their natures and 
the "arete" of a name, i.e., the quality in virtue of which it performs its 
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function well is the making clear of the natures of the things named, then 
is it not eminently reasonable that the way to make a name perform its 
function in accordance with its arete is by defining it correctly as 
Socrates so aptly illustrates in the above-quoted passages? By this 
reasoning, the thesis that correctness of name is equivalent not to correct-
ness of vocal sound, but to correctness of definition, becomes conspicuous 
in the Cratylus by its absence. And it is in keeping with the dramatic 
intent of the dialogue suggested above that Plato should have sought to 
make the point this way. 
Furthermore, by assuming that Plato intended for his reader to under-
stand that what he was really getting at in the Cratylus was that correct-
ness of name is equivalent to correctness of definition, many of the 
apparent discrepancies in the dialogue can be easily resolved. First of 
all, the abstract of the nature theory argument presented in Chapter II 
(see above, p. 44 ff) can no longer be rejected by denying premise #11. On 
the previous analysis of that argument it was asserted that it was open to 
the conventionalist to deny that a namemaker has to have a certain skill on 
the ground that if vocal sounds were correct by convention and agreement, 
these certainly required no skill. But once it is understood that the task 
of the namemaker is to provide the correct definition of the name, the 
objection is vitiated and the argument is valid. The assumption also makes 
it perfectly reasonable why the dialectician should superintend the work of 
12 
the namemaker (who, by our assumption is no longer a grammarian; cf. 
above, p. 82 , n. 22). 
Second, it provides a plausible explanation of what Plato means when 
13 he talks about embodying the same form in different letters and syllables. 
It is no longer necessary to resort to such totally unfounded suppositions 
as that Plato was proposing an ideal language or that he believed there was 
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a separate and distinct form of each name. To embody the form of the name 
in letters and syllables is simply to transform an arbitrarily chosen vocal 
sound into an instrument for separating things into classes, a process 
which is effected by defining the name. And embodying the same form in 
different syllables simply means giving the same definition to two different 
vocal sounds. 
Third, our assumption enables us at least to make sense out of what is 
probably the most perplexing statement in the entire Cratylus, namely that 
it is the law which gives us the names we use and that the namemaker is 
therefore the lawgiver (388 E). By our assumption, these statements are to 
be interpreted as meaning roughly that the law gives us the definitions 
that we use and that the lawgiver is he who decides how reality should be 
"carved up" into various classes. (Thus it is, for Plato, of the utmost 
importance that the dialectician at least supervise the lawgiver's work, 
and at best actually become the lawgiver.) What Plato has in mmd here can 
perhaps best be brought out by considering the following passage from the 
Republic. 
And yet if the growth of a nature like this had been 
pruned from earliest childhood, cleared of those clinging 
overgrowths which come of gluttony and all luxurious pleasure 
and, like leaden weights charged with affinity to this mortal 
world, hang upon the soul, bending its vision downwards; if, 
freed from these, the soul were turned round towards true 
reality, then this same power in these very men would see the 
truth as keenly as the objects it is turned to now. 
Yes, very likely. 
Is it not also likely, or indeed certain after what has 
been said, that a state can never be properly governed either 
by the uneducated who know nothing of truth or by men who are 
allowed to spend all their days in the pursuit of culture? 
The ignorant have no single mark before their eyes at which 
they must aim in all the conduct of their own lives and of 
affairs of state; and the others will not engage in action 
if they can help it, dreaming that, while still alive, they 
have been translated to the Islands of the Blest. 
Quite true. 
It is for us, then, as founders of a commonwealth, to 
bring compulsion to bear on the noblest natures. They must 
be made to climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness, which 
we called the highest object of knowledge; and, when they 
have looked upon it long enough, they must not be allowed, as 
they now are, to remain on the heights, refusing to come down 
again to the prisoners or to take any part in their labours 
and rewards, however much or little these may be worth. 
Shall we not be doing them an injustice, if we force on 
them a worse life than they might have? 
You have forgotten again, my friend, that the law is not 
concerned to make any one class specially happy, but to ensure 
the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. By persuasion or 
constraint it will unite the citizens in harmony, making them 
share whatever benefits each class can contribute to- the 
common good; and its purpose in forming men of that spirit 
was not that each should be left to go his own way, but that 
they should be instrumental in binding the community into one. 
True, I had forgotten. 
You will see, then, Glaucon, that there will be no real 
injustice in compelling our philosophers to watch over and 
care for the other citizens. We can fairly tell them that 
their compeers in other states may quite reasonably refuse to 
collaborate: there they have sprung up, like a self-sown 
plant, in despite of their country's institutions; no one 
has fostered their growth, and they cannot be expected to 
show gratitude for a care they have never received. "But," 
we shall say, "it is not so with you. We have brought you 
into existence for your country's sake as well as for your 
own) to be like leaders and king-bees in a hive; you have 
been better and more thoroughly educated than those others 
and hence you are more capable of playing your part both as 
men of thought and as men of action. You must go down, then, 
each in his turn, to live with the rest and let your eyes 
grow accustomed to the darkness. You will then see a thou-
sand times better than those who live there always; you will 
recognize every image for what it is and know what it repre-
sents, because you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in 
their reality; and so you and we shall find life in our com-
monwealth no mere dream, as it is in most existing states, 
where men live fighting one another about shadows and 
quarrelling for power, as if that were a great prize; whereas 
m truth government can be at its best and free from dissen-
sion only where the destined rulers are least desirous of 
holding office."14 
What Plato shows in this passage is that it is (and not merely should 
be) the responsibility of the lawgivers, the framers of the iroXixsia, to 
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ensure the welfare of the whole society. These lawgivers, who have either 
neglected or misunderstood what is involved in these responsibilities, are 
the ultimate source for the sorry state of existing societies (represented 
by the prisoners in the cave). These societies are characterized by ignor-
ance because they do not distinguish the true realities from their images 
and therefore do not know what those images represent. Just as in Plato's 
commonwealth the founders are responsible for giving to the state a iroXixEia 
which will ensure that reality is "carved up at the joints," so the founders 
or nomothetes of existing states have given to them a iroXixEia which 
ensures ignorance and error. It is in this sense that the law determines 
how we use and understand names in the way that we do. 
Finally our assumption allows a more temperate interpretation of what 
appears to be a total rejection of names (and therefore language) by 
Socrates at the end of the dialogue. 
. . . but surely no man of sense can allow himself and his 
soul to be cultivated (8EpaTr£U/£iv) by the study of names 
and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming 
that he knows anything.15 
If our assumption is correct, then Plato is simply restating a point 
he has already made, in the Cratylus and elsewhere, that it is impossible 
to know whether or not a definition of a name is correct by inspecting 
either the name or him who defined it. Such knowledge is made possible only 
by knowing the nature or essence of the thing named, for the definition is 
nothing other than a description of that essence. And for Plato, being 
able to give a correct description of such essences was the surest indi-
cator of knowledge. 
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FOOTNOTES 
E.g., by Robinson, "A Criticism of Plato's Cratylus," (Phil. Review, 
1956), pp. 327 ff. 
2 
Ammonius, p. 34. It is obvious that Ammonius has borrowed the simile 
in the last line from Plato. Cf. Theaetetus, 206 D. 
3 
E.g., Henry Jackson, Cambridge Prelections (Cambridge 1906), p. 11. 
The plausibility of reconciling a belief in Heracliteanism with a belief in 
the natural correctness of names was also argued for above, pp. 26 ff. 
4 
Jowett does not see fit to give the reply any special attention and 
translates it "certainly," as he does the much weaker iravu YE. Fowler seems 
to think it suggests politeness and translates it, "most assuredly." Only 
Burges, who is committed to a literal translation, takes account of the 
emphasis and translates, "most of all." 
This account still leaves unresolved the discrepancy between Ammonius's 
account of Cratylus's naturalism and Plato's account. Nevertheless the dis-
crepancy is outweighed by the iravxajv yaAioxa response. It is perhaps worth 
noting that Socrates's question to which this response is given uses the 
ambiguous phrase, "the thing named" (xou" irpayyaxos). 
This statement may appear inconsistent with one expressed earlier 
(above, p. 64) to the effect that an unstated assumption of Socrates's 
nature theory argument is that correctness of name is equivalent to correct-
ness of vocal sound. The inconsistency is only apparent, however, since in 
the earlier statement it was assumed that the-nature-theory-plus-the-
etymologies-plus-the mimetic-theory represented one continuous argument. 
In the present statement, it is assumed that the nature-theory argument 
which appears prior to the etymologies is self-contained. 
7 
At 394 C, Socrates points out that Hector, Astyanax, and Archepolis 
do not have a single letter in common. 
8Crat., 433 C. 
g 
Richard Robinson, "A Criticism of Plato's Cratylus," p. 330, for 
example, thinks of this section as providing "unchallengeable arguments" 
against "the nature theory." 
For other instances of the same kind, see Crat., 390 D, and esp. 
Statesman, 259 A-C. 
One very attractive feature of this interpretation is that with 
respect to the question of the correctness of names, it makes the Cratylus 
all of a piece with the rest of the dialogues. I am not aware of a single 
instance in any other dialogue where this question is considered, and it is 
not the case that the vocal sound is nothing and the definition is all. 
Supportive examples occur again and again throughout the dialogues and it 
would be an immensely tedious task to find and list all of them. However, 
the following all clearly illustrate the point: Phaedo, 70 C; Theaet., 
177 E, 184 B; Stat., 261 E, Parm., 133 C-D; Tim., 48 B. 
12 
Another obvious point which seems to have been ignored in the 
literature is that the cooperative roles of the dialectician and the law-
giver/nauemaker of the Cratylus seem clearly to anticipate the union of 
these roles in the philosopher-king of the Republic. 
13 
As a good example of how greatly these remarks have been misunder-
stood, consider the following from Robinson: 
That there must be much arbitrariness in the invention 
of new names is concealed through most of the Cratylus by the 
assumption that the business of a name is to describe its 
nominate. But the doctrine appears, in a distorted version, 
in "Socrates".1 peculiar view that the form of a name can be 
the same in different syllables: "If not every lawgiver 
embodies the name in the same syllables, we must not forget 
this: not every smith embodies the tool in the same iron, 
though he makes it for the same purpose" (389 D-E, retaining 
the difficult ayvoelv cf. 393-94). There is no single form 
which the sound must have in order'to be a name of the 
thing (op. cit., p. 340). 
14 
Rep., 519 C-520 D, Cornford's translation. 
15Crat., 440 C. 
Cf., Crat., 439 B, and Theaet., 147 B. 
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